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Procedure and Judicial Review Under Section 2,
Ninth of the Railway Labor Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Under Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act,' the National Media-
tion Board has responsibility for certifying collective bargaining repre-
sentatives. The Board's determinations are generally final and conclusive
and not subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court recently, in
Brotherhood of Ry. &' S.S. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-
Contract Employees,' clarified this area and set out the extent of review
available. The NMB's ultimate finding regarding certification of a collec-
tive bargaining representative is unreviewable, but the procedure used
in reaching its decision is reviewable to insure that the Board performs its
statutory duty and accords the parties due process. This comment will
examine the exceptions to non-reviewability, the criteria used by the




The general purposes of the Railway Labor Act set forth in title I,
section 2, among others, are:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any
carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon the freedom of
association among employees . . . ; (3) to provide for complete independence
of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization .... '
Section 2, Third gives employees the right to select their, bargaining
representatives without carrier interference, influence, or coercion." Under
148 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1964).
2 380 U.S. 650 (1965) [hereinafter ABNE].
344 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964). In Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300
U.S. 515 (1934), the Court stated that the "major objective [of the act] is the avoidance of in-
dustrial strife, by conference between the authorized representatives of employer and employee. ...
[The statute is] aimed at securing settlement of labor disputes by inducing collective bargaining
with the true representative of the employee .. " Id. at 547-48.
444 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1964).
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section 2, Fourth they have the right to organize and choose their repre-
sentative by majority vote of the craft or class involved.! Section 2, Ninth
was added in 1934, and established the procedure to be used in selecting
the representative of the employees.' The NMB was given jurisdiction to
settle disputes arising among a carrier's employees regarding the proper
bargaining representative. It has the duty to investigate such disputes
upon request of either party and to certify the proper representative within
thirty days from the invocation of its services. A carrier is placed under
the duty to "treat" with the certified representative.7 The Board has dis-
'44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1964). This has been interpreted to mean a
majority of those employees voting rather than a majority of the entire craft or class involved.
Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1934). See also text accompanying notes
70-74 infra.
648 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1964). In fact, most of the substantive rules
published by the NMB concern this procedure. See 29 C.F.R. § 1206 (1965).
'48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1964). This duty can be enforced (1) by the
judiciary as in the Virginian Ry. case, supra note 3, (2) by strike, or (3) by filing a complaint with
the CAB under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (k) (4), 72 Stat. 754, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371 (k) (4) (1964) which requires compliance with the Railway Labor Act as a prerequisite for
holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity. In this type proceeding the CAB will not
consider the propriety of an NMB craft or class determination. See Southern Pilots Ass'n v. CAB,
323 F.2d 288, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964). Where the complainant
goes to the CAB under § 401 (k) (4), as in Southern Pilots Ass'n, supra, alleging unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of the Railway Labor Act, the CAB has jurisdiction to hear the complaint, but
possibly has discretion to refuse to hear the complaint if it finds that a hearing would not be in the
public interest, even if reasonable grounds are found and the complaint is legally sufficient. See
Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964):
[T]he Board does have a discretionary power to dismiss a complaint which states
reasonable grounds for believing that the Act has been or is being violated when it
reasonably concludes that it would be in the public interest to do so, although this
discretion is subject to review. . . . [T]he Board is not expected to act as a general
labor board . . . [but] if the Board is denied [the power to dismiss] that is the
role it would be obliged to assume. Id. at 314-15.
See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, Civil No. 19694, D.C. Cir., 28 April 1966; Flight Eng'rs
Int'l v. Western Airlines, 34 C.A.B. 834, 835-36 (1961). Since the CAB has clearly stated that it
will not review NMB determinations (See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Southern Airways, Inc., CAB
Docket No. 11654, CAB Order No. 19162 (3 Jan. 1963)) a further question presents itself. If the
CAB does accept jurisdiction and hears the charges, does it have to decide them, especially when a
representation dispute is involved? The Supreme Court has not passed on the question of CAB dis-
cretion in this situation. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (k) (4), uses mandatory language:
"It shall be a condition upon the holding of a certificate by any air carrier that such carrier shall
comply with sections 181-188 of Title 45." (Emphasis added.) However, support is found for the
exercise of discretion by the CAB in § 401 (g): "The Board upon petition or complaint . . . may
• . . suspend any such certificate . . . or may revoke any such certificate . . . for intentional failure
to comply . . . [with § 401(k) (4)] .. " Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(g), 72 Stat. 754,
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (g) (1964). (Emphasis added.) This provision was used as supple-
mental support for upholding the CAB's refusal to act in Flight Eng'rs, supra at 315. A further
question is whether a judicial determination that the Railway Labor Act has been violated requires
the CAB to follow such decision and withhold a carrier's certificate under § 401 (k) (4). Stated
differently, could a union, after a judicial determination, go to the CAB and ask for withholding
of the carrier's certificate without having to relitigate the issue? This question may arise and be
answered in the multifacited proecedings involving Aaxico Airlines, Inc. Here the CAB had de-
ferred determination until related federal district court proceedings were decided. These involved
both a contract dispute and alleged violations of the Railway Labor Act. The contract dispute is
now before the System Board of Adjustment. The district court also found that Aaxico had violated
title II of the act. See Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 851 (1964), reversing the district court's finding on the contractural dis-
pute. On remand, the district court reaffirmed its earlier finding that Aaxico had violated title II
of the act. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Aaxico Airlines, Inc., Civil No. 2996, W.D. Tex., 3 March 1965
(supplemental order, 12 March 1965), aff'd per curiam, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 2560
(5th Cir. 9 March 1966). Conceding that the CAB's initial jurisdiction is discretionary, would it
have to act after a determination by the court, and if it refused to act would it be an abuse of
discretion? The CAB's original deferral of the question of alleged labor violations arising in con-
text with a merger between Aaxico and Saturn Airlines which itself was approved, see examiner's
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cretion as to the manner in which the determination is made, the only
caveat being to insure freedom from carrier "interference, influence, or
coercion." Under section 2, Ninth the NMB must first ascertain whether
there is a representation dispute. If one exists, the Board may, in its dis-
cretion, order an election. If an election is held, the NMB must determine
which employees are eligible to vote, i.e., the scope of the craft or class.'
B. Procedure Under Section 2, Ninth
The NIB's statutory duty under Section 2, Ninth is to investigate the
facts upon application of a party. Once the facts, which may include an
election, are determined, its function ceases except for certification of the
representative.' It seems that the Board itself determines what is reason-
able and necessary,"0 and the courts will not review its determination
except to insure that due process was accorded and that the Board was
not acting in excess of its statutory command.
In making a craft or class determination, the NMB fulfills its duty to
investigate by considering "all relevant elements, most important of which
is the intent of the Act in settling disputes and promoting stable labor
relations."'" The Board has set out several general criteria which it con-
siders and weighs in making its determination:
(1) the composition and relative permanency of employee grouping
along craft or class lines on carriers in general as well as the particular
carrier;
(2) the extent and effectiveness of past arrangements;
(3) the functions, duties, and responsibilities of the employees and the
general nature of their work;
(4) the community of interest existing between jobs, i.e., the existence
of a close work relationship with other employees within the group; and
initial decision in Saturn-Aaxico Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 15675 (1 June 1965), petition for
review dismissed but order amended in other respects, CAB Order No. E-22680 (21 Sept. 1965),
was questioned on appeal as an abuse of discretion. This question was answered negatively. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, Civil No. 19694, D.C. Cir., 28 April 1966. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n
No. 40, supra, is the leading case interpreting section 2, Ninth. It involved an enforcement pro-
ceeding to make a carrier bargain with the certified representative. The Court held that a carrier
had the duty to bargain with the representative and that this duty was enforceable through the
general equity power of the courts. There are no enforcement provisions in the act itself and,
unless enforced by the courts, no way exists to enforce collective bargaining. This was expressly
recognized in Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943). See also Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (jurisdiction exists to protect minority of a craft
or class from violation of the statutory duty of a union to represent the entire group).
'The act itself does not define the terms "craft or class." As the NMB has put it: "The Board
has no power . . . to create crafts or classes. . . . It does, however, have the power to designate
what employees may participate...." Representation of Employees of the KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines-Passenger & Cargo Agents, Operations Clerks, Fleet Service & Stores Clerks, Chauffers &
Commissary Personnel, 3 NMB Determinations of Craft or Class 1, 4 (1953) (File No. C-2098).
948 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1964). See Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320
U.S. 297, 305 (1943). The employees themselves elect the representatives. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Third
& Fourth. See, e.g., United Transp. Serv. v. NMB, 179 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1949). It should be
noted that § 2, Ninth allows the NMB to appoint a committee to determine craft or class issues.
The most striking example was the Donaldson Committee's determination that the cockpit crew at
United Air Lines was one unit. It was this decision which has given rise to all the litigation in-
volving the Flight Engineers International. The NMB also has unrelated functions under § 5 of
the act. 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964). See note 32 infra.
0 See text accompanying notes 11-15 infra for the criteria used in reaching a determination.
1' NMB, ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT 1934-1957, at 20 (1958).
1966]
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(5) previous Board decisions.'
The Board has the power to "splinter," "amalgamate," or "regroup"
historic bargaining groups in light of technological and functional changes
in the industry." However, as a general policy factor, the NMB is in-
clined to avoid unnecessary multiplication of the craft or class groupings.
It feels that excessive groupings tend to thwart the purposes of the act by
creating rather than solving numerous labor disputes, and impairing effic-
ency of operation."4 The investigation does not have to take any particular
form and need be no more than the nature of the case requires." As stated
in Hannah v. Larch:"
The requirements of due process ... vary with the type of proceeding in-
volved .... When governmental action does not partake of an adjudication,
as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted,
it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Craft Or Class Determinations
In Switcbmen's Union v. NMB," section 2, Ninth of the act was inter-
preted by the Supreme Court to forbid judicial review of NMB determi-
nations of craft or class. The Court stated that:
12Id. at 20-21. For other statements of the factors considered by the Board in arriving at its
determinations, see 26 NMB ANN. Rrp. 29 (1960) (past practice in grouping; the nature, super-
vision, lines of promotion, and seniority; protection of employees from arbitrary action; aid efficient
operation by development of definite lines of grouping; and finally, the public interest in interstate
commerce). See also 16 NMB ANN. REp. 22 (1950) (stabilization of well-recognized crafts or
classes tend to stabilize collective bargaining relationships and as a policy factor such groupings
would be followed).
" UNA Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, 294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 956 (1962).
14NMB, ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 21. For an
application of these factors to a particular fact situation, see, e.g., Representation of Employees of
the National Airlines, Inc.-Airline Mechanics, 1 NMB Determinations of Craft or Class 423
(1947) (commonly referred to as Case No. R-1706). This is the keystone case for the particular
craft or class grouping involved in ABNE. The record was developed from the mediators' investiga-
tions, public hearings, and written briefs. There was, at this time, little or no uniformity in group-
ings on air carriers. The Board found that "clerical, office, stores, fleet, and passenger service em-
ployees" was the proper grouping. In so determining, the NMB used a variety of the considerations
listed in the text. While the Board in the ABNE case followed the R-1706 grouping, no reason
exists for its not reconsidering this unit upon proper application, if the evidence warranted. It
said as much in its denial of a rehearing in the R-1706 case (at p. 445) and reaffirmed this state-
ment in a later case. Representation of Employees of the Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Clerical, Office,
Stores, Fleet & Passenger Service Employees, 2 NMB Determinations of Craft or Class 60, 67 (1951)
(Case No. R-2357). In fact the Board has reexamined and not followed its determination in
R-1706. See, e.g., Representation of Employees of Trans-Texas Airways, Inc. & the North Central
Airlines, Inc.-Stock & Stores Employees, 3 NMB Determinations of Craft or Class 16 (1956)
(File Nos. C-2252, C-2389). In this case and also in Representation of Employees of Northwest
Airlines, Inc.-Stock & Stores Employees, NMB Case No. R-2783 (1953), the stock and stores em-
ployees, which the NMB included in the R-1706 grouping but treated as a separate grouping in
these cases, had historically (before R-1706) been represented as a separate craft or class (separately
represented on twenty-four carriers and grouped under R-1706 on only six carriers). ABNE may
indicate that the NMB has determined to consolidate under R-1706, hence avoiding unnecessary
multiplication of groupings. See 380 U.S. at 665 n.4.
Is See, e.g., Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 913 (1964); WES Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, 314 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
1' 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1959).
17 320 U.S. 297 (1943). For an excellent criticism of this case, see JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 343-45 (1965).
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Under this Act Congress did not give the Board discretion to take or with-
hold action, to grant or deny relief. It gave no enforcement functions.
It was to find the fact and then cease .... Here ... the intent seems plain
-the dispute was to reach its last terminal point when the administrative
finding was made. There was to be no dragging out of the controversy into
other tribunals of law."'
Expressly reserving all constitutional questions, 1 the Court based its de-
cision on its interpretation of the act's legislative history. The Court stated
that a NMB determination of an appropriate craft or class was incidental
to its power to resolve controversies under section 2, Ninth.0 In a vigorous
dissent Mr. Justice Rutledge warned that the Court was allowing the
NMB's interpretation of the statutory standards enacted for its guidance
to be final and conclusive." In a companion case dealing with the question
of which of two unions should have been certified, the Court reserved
the question of "whether judicial power may ever be exerted to require
the Mediation Board to exercise the 'duty' imposed upon it under 2,
Ninth ..
Since the decision in Switchmen's and its companion cases, the lower
courts have almost consistently adhered to the doctrine of unreviewability
in a number of varying factual situations.' In Rose v. Brotherhood of
Ky. &q S.S. Clerks,5 the court stated that a court could, in a proper case,
review the validity or sufficiency of a certification by the NMB in a pro-
ceeding for judicial enforcement." However, the court refused to review
the certification in question prior to an enforcement proceeding." The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed after the decision in
Switchmen's, established minimum procedural safeguards to be used by
all federal agencies unless exempted. Section 10 of the APA2 ' gives the
right to judicial review "except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial
review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion. ..
s 320 U.S. at 305.
'lld. at 301.
20 Ibid.
21ld. at 318-19, 321-22.
22 General Comm. of Adjustment, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 320
U.S. 323, 336 n.12 (1943).
23 General Comm. of Adjustment, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Southern Pac. Co., 320 U.S.
338 (1943); General Comm. of Adjustment, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex.
R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943).
"See, e.g., Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, 338 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Ruby v. American
Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913 (1964); Flight Eng'rs
Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1963); WES Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l
v. NMB, 314 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. NMB, 294
F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 810 (1962); UNA Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l
v. NMB, 294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Decker v. Linea
Aeropostal Venezolana, 258 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S.A. v. Edwards,
244 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1957); American Air Export & Import Co. v. O'Neill, 221 F.2d 829
(D.C. Cir. 1954); Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 849 (1951); Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, 230 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 338
F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Droggos v. NMB, 227 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
22 181 F.2d 801 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
2M This was based on the decision in Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1934).
21 See cases cited note 24 supra.
2860 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (1964).
2 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
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Thus, the existing law as set forth by Switchmen's was not altered."
One court" has held that the APA provides for review of the Board's
jurisdiction over a dispute. The question, however, went to the power of
the Board to make a determination, as distinguished from the correctness
of it, and the court recognized that no review was available where Switch-
men's prevented it.
B. De Facto Jurisdiction Over "Unfair Labor Practices"
If in the course of NMB proceedings under section 2, Ninth, a party
alleges that a union and/or the carrier have been violating the act, then
the question arises as to whether the NMB has exceeded its jurisdiction by
deciding a prohibited labor practice under section 2, Third, Fourth, or
Fifth of the act." The courts have declined to consider the question directly,
stating instead that they have no jurisdiction to review a determination
under section 2, Ninth. 3 In Ruby v. American Airlines,' the Air Lines
Pilots Association (ALPA) alleged in a representation proceeding instituted
by a new union that the new union, composed solely of pilots on American
Airlines, was employer dominated and assisted. ALPA contended that
Switchmen's did not bar review because there the allegation was an un-
lawful selection of the bargaining representative; here, the allegation was
that the NMB had condoned illegal tactics. The court, however, held that
it could not compel bargaining in the face of a representation dispute
pending before the NMB; that the Board, under Switchmen's, had exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the claim; and that its determination was not
subject to review."5 As stated in Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 6 where there is doubt as to representation, such doubts are to be re-
30 See American Air Export & Import Co. v. O'Neill, 221 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Kirland
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Davis, Unreviewable Administrative
Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 427 (1959).
"'Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849
(1951). The question was whether the NMB had violated the act by denying it had jurisdiction
to hear a representation claim of employees located outside the United States.
2Under section 2, Ninth, 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth, the NMB does not
have jurisdiction to find prohibited practices under the act, nor do §§ 4 & 5 give the NMB juris-
diction. 44 Stat. 579, 580 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 154, 155 (1964). Under § 5 the
NMB can only provide mediation services in "major" disputes and related functions. In limited cir-
cumstances, under § 5, Second the NMB can interpret agreements, i.e., "minor" disputes, provided
the agreement was arrived at by mediation. See also text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
' See, e.g., Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, 338 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Ruby v. American
Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913 (1964); Flight Eng'rs Int'l
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1963); WES Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l v.
NMB, 314 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962); UNA Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, 294 F.2d 905
(D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962). See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra. It
should be noted however, that this does not prevent the courts from taking jurisdiction where the
context has strongly indicated either that the NMB by refusing to act has obliterated rights guaran-
teed to employees, see, e.g., Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951), or has acted in excess of its statutory authority, see text accom-
panying notes 41-47 infra. Also this does not prevent the courts from reviewing the Board's pro-
cedure. See WES Chapter, Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. NMB, supra at 237. See text accompanying notes
58-67 infra. The NMB itself has set aside an election after finding a violation of § 2, Fourth during
the election by the carrier. Representation of Employees of Linea Aeropostal Venezolana-(1) Air-
line Mechanics, & (2) Stockroom Employees, 3 NMB Determinations of Craft or Class 54 (1955)
(commonly referred to as Case No. R-2938).
34 323 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913 (1964).
"SThis case was cited with approval in ABNE, 380 U.S. at 662 n.3.
36311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 32
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solved by the NMB, even if a prohibited labor practice is alleged by one
of the parties." Since the CAB has also refused to review NMB determi-
nations under section 2, Ninth,"8 the ultimate determination of a prohibited
labor practice claim when it arises in conjunction with a representation
dispute seems to rest with the NMB. It should be pointed out that the
NMB probably has discretion to decline to act on a petition under section
2, Ninth. This is pointed up by the NMB's action in a pending proceeding
arising out of the Aaxico dispute."' Independent Flight Crew Association,
an independent union formed at Aaxico, has petitioned the NMB for
certification. The NMB has not acted on this petition, not even to the
extent of assigning it a file number. It has, however, solicited comments
from all the parties involved, and is evidently awaiting the outcome of
the various court proceedings before taking action. Thus, it would seem
that the NMB has, in this proceeding, satisfied its duty to investigate, and
is merely exercising its discretion in refusing to act until the court pro-
ceedings are determined. '
C. Action In Excess Of Statutory Authority
Although no case has been found holding that the NMB acted in
excess of its statutory authority,' a leading case holding that a parallel
agency acted in excess of its statutory authority is Leedom v. Kyne.' The
National Labor Relations Board had issued a representation certification
order under Section 9 (b) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. 3
The petitioner argued that the NLRB determination of employee status
(the question of whether professional employees belonged in the bargain-
ing unit) was "made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a
specific prohibition in the Act."" The Supreme Court held that the federal
courts had the power to review a determination by the NLRB which
exceeded its statutory authority, even though no provision for direct
" The court cited General Comm. of Adjustment, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-
Tex. R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943), as authority.
a See note 7 supra (extended discussion of the CAB's role).
'Discussed in note 7 supra. The petition for certification was filed while the trial in the dis-
trict court was being conducted.
"The NMB has not publicly stated its reasons for its refusal to take any further action on the
union's petition which was filed on 12 June 1965 and refiled on 18 November 1965 after Aaxico
applied to the CAB for approval of the proposed merger with Saturn Airlines. The reason stated is
this writer's opinion. The NMB's action here can be contrasted with its action in Flight Eng'rs Int'l
v. NMB, 338 F.2d 280, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In this case the NMB decided an issue of employee
replacement in the context of a representation dispute. The court affirmed the NMB's jurisdiction to
make such a determination as incidental to its power to determine voter eligibility under § 2, Ninth.
See also Flight Eng'rs Int'l v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
" In the cases decided after Switchmen's, where the question was raised, the courts have found
no merit to the claim. See cases cited note 33 supra; see text accompanying notes 32-37 supra. See
also Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. NMB, 294 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 810 (1962). One point used by the courts in these cases is that the NMB did not admit
it had acted in a way which violated a clear and express command of the act. See notes 44 & 47
infra.
42358 U.S. 184 (1958).
4349 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1964). This
is similar to the procedure used by the NMB under § 2, Ninth.
44358 U.S. at 188. The NLRB admitted that it had acted contrary to the express language of
the act in determining, without their prior consent, that professional employees belonged in the bar-
gaining unit.
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review was provided by the statute. In Boire v. Greyhound Corp.,ls the
Supreme Court reemphasized the "painstakingly delineated procedural
boundaries of Kyne," where the NLRB had determined" that Greyhound
was a joint employer with Floors, Inc., which furnished attendants for
Greyhound's terminals. Greyhound, in a suit for injunctive relief, con-
tended that the Board's determination violated the act. The lower courts
agreed and found that Greyhound was not a joint employer with Floors,
Inc. In reversing, the Supreme Court distinguished and limited Kyne.
In Kyne the question was one of statutory construction but here the ques-
tion was a factual one which was not clearly in excess of the NLRB's
authority, and hence not subject to direct judicial review."
IV. BROTHERHOOD OF Ry. & S.S. CLERKS v. ASSOCIATION FOR BENEFIT
OF NON-CONTRACT EMPLOYEES
Due to a merger between Capital Airlines, Inc. and United Air Lines,
Inc. a dispute arose concerning the proper bargaining representative for
a craft class grouping known as "clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger
service employees."' 8 The Brotherhood of Railway & Steam Ship Clerks
(Railway Clerks) petitioned the NMB to conduct a certification pro-
ceeding. After investigation the NMB scheduled an election by secret
ballot. United sought to enjoin the election" after the Board denied its
request for a hearing, with its participation, on the scope of the designated
craft or class. The action was dismissed and United appealed. While the
appeal was pending, a group of United's employees (part of the craft or
class)"0 formed the Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Em-
ployees (ABNE) and petitioned the NMB to allow its intervention in
the pending proceedings." The NMB dismissed the petition on the ground
that ABNE was not a proper party in interest. ABNE filed suit to enjoin
" 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
4 Under the National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat.
143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
" The act provides for indirect review in an enforcement proceeding. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as
amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1964). It should be noted, as pointed out in
Kyne that "this suit is not one to 'review,' in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision
of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an order . . .made in
excess of its delegated powers .. " 358 U.S. at 188. After the decision in Boire, the Kyne doc-
trine probably applies only when no factual dispute exists and all the parties agree that there has been
a violation of the act. See note 44 supra.
48 See note 14 supra. This is the R-1706 grouping.
" United Air Lines, Inc. v. NMB, Civil No. 402-63, D.D.C., 25 March 1963. United also sought
an order directing the NMB to hold a hearing and redetermine the form of the election ballot used.
In the Railway Clerks' original petition it did not seek to represent the R-1706 grouping, but when
United and the competing union (IAM) objected, it amended its petition. Railway Clerks also in-
stituted suit in a federal district court in Illinois against United to enforce its collective bargaining
agreement which it had with Capital, although the agreement had not been imposed upon United
by the CAB as a condition to its merger. The court dismissed on the ground that it involved a
dispute over the bargaining representatives and hence under NMB jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, stating that the court had no jurisdiction where the validity of a contract depends on the
merits of a representation dispute. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. NMB, 325 F.2d 576 (6th
Cir. 1963).
" Composed of those employees not represented by either IAM or Railway Clerks.
NMB Case No. R-3590 (pending Railway Clerks application). ABNE asked the NMB to re-
determine the craft or class grouping with or without a hearing, and to change the ballot form so
as to provide a place for a no vote. After requesting intervention, ABNE informed the NMB by
letter that (1) it was not seeking recognition as a bargaining unit, and did not want its name on
the ballot and (2) it would dissolve after it had served its purpose.
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the Board from holding the scheduled election."2 Granting ABNE's re-
quest for an injunction, the district court ordered the NMB to change its
ballot form and remanded ABNE's request for a hearing on the craft or
class grouping for the Board's consideration."2 The Board and Railway
Clerks, which had intervened as a party defendant, appealed. Consolidating
United's appeal with that of the NMB and Railway Clerks, the court of
appeals affirmed per curiam.5 4 All three parties petitioned for certiorari
which was granted and consolidated for argument.
United argued that it possessed a substantial economic interest in the
composition of the craft or class,"2 and since there is no administrative or
judicial review, it had a right to participate in such determination. It
further contended that the Board did not fulfill its duty to investigate the
dispute.' The Supreme Court, in deciding these issues, answered the ques-
tion reserved in Switchmen's and its companion cases. s7 The Court held
that "the Board's action here is reviewable only to the extent that it bears
on the question of whether it performed its statutory duty to 'investigate'
the dispute."'" The Court stated that the methods and procedures used
were within the Board's discretion and that the Court would review them
only to determine whether they comported with procedural due process
and the duty to investigate.5 In reviewing the sufficency of the investi-
gation the Court laid down several factors which were considered in de-
termining whether the NMB performed its statutory duty and accorded
United procedural due process:
(1) the Board's past experience in the area under review;"
(2) whether the craft or class in question was "tried and true" or was
new and untested by experience;"
" Association for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees v. NMB, 218 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C.
1962). ABNE wanted the election enjoined unless the NMB (1) conducted a hearing on the craft
or class grouping, (2) granted ABNE status as a party in such hearing, and (3) changed the ballot
form to allow a "no" vote.
" Ibid.
'United Air Lines, Inc. v. NMB, 330 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In United's case no grounds
had been stated for the dismissal, but the court treated it as if the ground had been lack of stand-
ing. Judge Wright dissented from the result in the NMB and Railway Clerks appeal, contending
the court was without jurisdiction to interfere with the Board's determination.
5 380 U.S. at 660-61. United contended that since it had to treat with the certified repre-
sentative, any determination without its participation deprived it of its right of freedom of con-
tract and right to be free from arbitrary restraint in the pursuit of its business. Further, United
argued that there was not a community of interest existing among the employees and such grouping
would tend to disrupt morale among them and would have an adverse effect on its organizational
structure. Brief for United Air Lines, pp. 24-26, Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association
for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
50380 U.S. at 660-61.
57 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
"' 380 U.S. at 661.
"Id. at 661, 667. It seems that the review allowed, in effect, is merely whether the Board has
followed its criteria in reaching its decision and has considered any data submitted to it in light
of its policy as set out by these criteria. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. This approximates
the extent of review generally given by the courts to the general policy criteria of other agencies
subject to the substantial evidence rule. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Air-
lines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956). It is not clear exactly what data, if any, United presented in its
communication with the NMB. Possibly the submission of a detailed brief by a carrier presenting
data backing up its contentions would alleviate most of the problems, as the duty to investigate
should include serious consideration of such data. See text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
60 380 U.S. at 662, 666. This is merely giving due weight to the "expertise" of the Board.
65 Id. at 665. The Board itself seems to consider this in reaching its determination. See note 14
supra.
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(3) whether the party objecting to the composition of the craft or
class was a proper party to the dispute, i.e., a union or employees seeking
representation, or an "outsider" ;62
(4) the extent, if any, of prior participation of the party in a former
investigation of the same craft or class and the position it advocated then;"s
and
(5) the type of carrier involved as compared with the type involved
in a prior determination."4
As minimum procedural due process, the Board must consider any data
and letters submitted by a party contesting or supporting the craft or
class grouping,"s and as long as this is done, the NMB has performed its
duty to investigate and has accorded a party procedural due process."
The Court buttressed its conclusion by stating:-"
It must be remembered that United is under no compulsion to reach an
agreement with the ... representative .... The quality of the action com-
pelled, its reasonableness, and therefore the lawfulness of the compulsion,
must be judged in the light of conditions which have occasioned the exercise
of . . . power .. " Thus, while the Board's investigation . . . might impose
some additional burden on the carrier, we cannot say that the latter's interest
• . . requires the full panoply of procedural due process. We find support for
this conclusion when we consider the burden that acceptance ... would visit
upon the administration of the Act. To require full-dress hearing . . .
would fly in the face of Congress' instruction. . . . It places beyond reach
the speed which the Act's framers thought an objective of the first order.
A second and related question before the Court was the attack by
United and ABNE upon the form of the election ballot. Both contended
that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority. Two courts had pre-
viously held that the ballot form was unreviewable5 and only one district
court case," decided before Switchmen's, enjoined an election because the
ballot did not provide a place for a "no" vote. United and ABNE con-
tended that the ballot deprived an employee of the opportunity to vote
against representation. While the suit had been pending, the NMB changed
the ballot to give notice to employees that a desire for no representation
62 Id. at 663, 666. The Board considers only those who are seeking to represent the craft or
class as proper parties to the dispute. Carriers are forbidden from interfering with the choice by the
employees of a representative, and an investigation to determine the scope of the electorate is but
an incident to its duty to certify under the act. Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297, 301
(1943). As to whether a group of employees opposed to representation is a proper party, see text
accompanying notes 84-91 infra.
63 380 U.S. at 662-64, 667.
"4Id. at 664-65. I.e., a trunkline carrier as opposed to a major airline such as United.
" Id. at 666-67. This was done by the Board in this case through correspondence with United,
and its consideration of the claims made by United in such correspondence. See note 59 supra.
66380 U.S. at 666-67. Since the NMB "could not by a mere craft or class determination oc-
casion a deprivation of appellant's property . . . no notice of intention to make such a determina-
tion was constitutionally necessary." United Transp. Serv. v. NMB, 179 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
The full protection afforded by procedural due process is not required. See text accompanying notes
15-16 supra.
67380 U.S. at 667-68.
" Rose v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 181 F.2d 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
851 (1950); Droggos v. NMB, 227 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
"'McNulty v. NMB, 18 F. Supp. 494, 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1936).
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should be expressed by merely failing to vote."0 Although the Board has the
power to certify even though less than a majority of the craft or class
votes,' the Board's policy has been to require a majority vote within a
craft or class before it will certify."' Thus, if a majority did not vote,
no certificate would be issued.7 ' The NMB has not followed the presump-
tion in Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40 that those not voting assent
to the will of the majority of those who do vote.7' The Court held that
since the ballot is a discretionary means of election, the form chosen is
discretionary and not a violation of an express statutory command."
Therefore, Leedom v. Kyne, as limited by Boire v. Greyhound Corp.,"0
had no application, and the ballot form was not reviewable. Mr. Justice
Stewart dissented, contending that since substantive determinations by
the NMB were excluded from review there was need for review of the
Board's procedures to insure that they were fair and lawful. "[T]o de-
prive courts of jurisdiction to review the fundamental procedures used by
the Board in arriving at those determinations," he argued, " 'would indeed
be to "turn the blade inward .... . After reviewing the legislative history
of the act, he concluded that the ballot form should be changed."
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimate determinations of the NMB are discretionary and not subject
to review. The rules and criteria used in settling representation disputes70
will be reviewed only to the extent necessary to insure that the Board per-
forms its statutory duty to investigate. This seems to, or should, include
review to insure that the rules and criteria used bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the goals sought by the act. Less clear, however, is the question
of whether the courts can review and reform arbitrary action either in
the formulation or in the application of the Board's rules and criteria
used in the exercise of its duty under section 2, Ninth. There is authority0
" The ballot now has the following caption:
No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid
ballots, no representative will be certified.
7' See 40 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 541 (1947).7 2 See NMB, ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT 1934-1957, at 16-17 (1958). See,
e.g., Aviation Daily, 22 Oct. 1965, p. 303; Radio Officers Union v. NMB, 181 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
7 See note 72 supra.74 As the Court notes, the NLRB does follow this presumption. 380 U.S. at 670. See Virginian
Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 560 (1934).
" The act says nothing about the form of the ballot, only that a secret ballot may be used. 45
U.S.C. § 152, Ninth.
7 See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
77 380 U.S. at 672 (dissenting opinion).
70 Id. at 674-75. The legislative history shows that the drafters did not intend to deprive em-
ployees of the right to oppose representation. The majority of the Court recognized this. 380 U.S.
at 669 n.5.
70 The procedure might be outlined as follows:
(1) Investigation
a. rules for invoking the Board's jurisdiction
b. criteria used in determining the scope of the electorate
c. rules for the election
(2) Certification
0 See United Transp. Serv. Employees v. NMB, 141 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Order of Ry.
Conductors v. NMB, 141 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom., Order of Ry. Conductors
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 166 (1944).
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to the effect that there is no review of an arbitrary decision by the Board.
This would seem logically to follow under a strict adherance to Switch-
men's, in that even if arbitrary, the decision itself is precluded from re-
view. s" However, if the courts, in reviewing the NMB's duty to investigate,
hold that failure to follow estiblished rules or apply stated criteria is a
failure to perform its statutory duty, then this seemingly unjust result
can be avoided.
The dissent in ABNE seems to view the majority opinion as precluding
review of the Board's procedure as well as its substantive determination,
at least in so far as the form of the ballot is concerned. s2 As stated by
the majority, the form of the ballot is a policy question to be resolved by
the NMB,8' but it is submitted that the Court's statement as to unreview-
ability is misleading." If the sufficiency of the Board's investigation is
subject to review to insure that its duty was performed and due process
accorded, it follows that the Court would not refuse to strike down a
ballot so unfair as to be arbitrary and thereby deny employees the right
to choose, or oppose, a representative. The method of selection should at
least accord a minimum of fairness. However, the ballot used by the
NMB appears to be fundamentally fair and within the Board's discretion.
The Court's opinion in ABNE leaves unanswered the question of whether
a group of employees opposing representation have a right to intervene as
a party in interest in a Board proceeding under section 2, Ninth.2 The
NMB stated, "We agree ... that ABNE has standing to challenge the
form of the ballot.""s The Board opposed, however, the idea that ABNE
had the right to seek an injunction. s7 Although the Board has previously
"
5See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. S.S. Clerks v. United Transp. Serv. Employees, 137 F.2d 817
(D.C. Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 320 U.S. 715 (1943) (on the basis of Switchmen's and its com-
panion cases). See also JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 345 (1965) (cri-
ticizing Switchmen's and its effect in this case).
82 380 U.S. at 672 (dissenting opinion).
83 380 U.S. at 668-69, 671.
84 Id. at 671: "[T]he Board's choice of its proposed ballot is not subject to judicial review
. [because] such questions were left to the Board." The Court went on to note that the pro-
posed ballot under consideration was fair as was the Board's procedure.
" Id. at 660: "The Association concedes that the order does not enjoin the holding of the elec-
tion. . . .Thus, we need not reach the question of the Association's right to demand or participate
in proceedings leading to such a determination."
" Brief for the NMB, p. 20, n.7, Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for Benefit
of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
" Ibid. The NMB evidently construes the act as barring from participation any party not seek-
ing recognition, since the only reason for making a determination of craft or class composition is
so an election can be held and a representative certified. Thus, an association opposing collective
bargaining has no legally cognizable interest in the composition of the electorate. See S 2, First,
Third, Fourth & Ninth, 44 Stat. 1188 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. 5
152, First, Third, Fourth & Ninth (1964):
General Purposes . .. (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association .. .
or any denial . . . of the right of employees to join a labor organization. ...
First. It shall be the duty [of carriers and employees] to exert every reasonable effort
to make and maintain agreements. ...
Third. Representatives, for the purposes of this Act, shall be designated . ..without
interference. . ..
Fourth. Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives. . ..
N'inth. If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees .. . it shall be the duty
[Vol. 32
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recognized the right of an employee association to be a party where it
was seeking recognition as a bargaining representative, it denied ABNE
the right to intervene because it did not seek such recognition." Conceding
that the act is structured for collective bargaining," what rights should
ABNE have possessed to oppose the selection of a collective bargaining
representative? As an association of employees it is made up of members
of the craft or class involved. They have a vital interest in its composition
and should have the right to be heard. If unlimited this right could amount
to a "backdoor" means of avoiding the Court's decision, and might tend
to disrupt and impede NMB proceedings in contravention of the thirty-
day limitation in the act."0 However, the Board itself has asserted that a
representation dispute exists between those employees (or the union) who
wish representation and those who are opposed or indifferent to having a
representative.9' A different question is presented when the association is
formed after a representation dispute between two competing unions is
begun. In such a case the Board already has jurisdiction, and the associa-
tion is trying to intervene in an established proceeding. It should have the
right to be heard, but this is not to say it is entitled to a full hearing.
Perhaps the NMB should adopt a procedural rule similar to that of the
CAB, giving a person limited party status." Even if this is done the ques-
tion will arise as to whether an association such as ABNE is entitled to the
same rights as a union-the most important aspect, under past Board
practice, being the grant of a hearing when disagreement over the com-
position of the craft or class arises. A denial of such a hearing or a refusal
by the NMB to allow intervention would present the courts with the
question of whether such refusal was a denial of due process and a depriva-
tion of a right which constituted a failure to perform its statutory duty.
A. ]. Harper II
of the Mediation Board, upon request . . . to certify to both parties . . . the name
or names of the individuals or organizations . . . authorized to represent the employees
involved in the dispute. ...
SSBrief for the NMB, supra note 85, at 19, 61.
s See note 86 supra.
" The thirty-day limitation in the act was used by the Court in ABNE as a basis for denying
full-dress hearings. 380 U.S. at 668.
"'See 30 NMB ANN. REp. 32 (1964); 29 NMB ANN. REP. 35 (1963). See also McIntyre,
The Railway Labor Act-A Misfit for the Airlines, 19 J. AIR L. & CoM. 274, 277-78 (1952).
9214 C.F.R. § 302.14 (1965).
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State Regulation of Interstate Utility Securities -
The Need for a Reappraisal
I. INTRODUCTION
An issuance of securities may often go unnoticed by the general public.
Normally only a relatively small group of persons such as corporate
officials, underwriters, brokers, and eventually, the investor, will be directly
affected by the basis and purpose behind the issuance of securities. If the
securities are unattractive to future investors and they decline in value,
the investor and perhaps the corporation will most heavily feel the impact
and not the public at large. However, this may not be the case when a
public utility issues securities. Because of a utility's effect on the consuming
public, the basis, purpose, and application of the proceeds of a public
utility security issuance may have a direct influence on the quantity and
quality of the service it provides. A utility's capital structure may be re-
flected in the price of an airplane ticket or a telephone call. For this reason,
most states have established public utility commissions to regulate the
securities, rates, and other matters dealing with public utilities. The re-
cent case of United Air Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n' illus-
trates the working of one of these commissions in dealing with a multi-
million dollar security issuance by a large interstate utility.
This Comment will examine the differences between a blue sky law
and a state public utility security regulation, the purpose behind each, and
in the case of a public utility, if the individual state can carry out its
purpose.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Utility Regulations-Their Development
The present degree of public utility regulation is often taken for
granted. The recent transit strike in New York City brought about an
acute awareness of the necessity for continuing service by a public utility
and the need for regulatory controls. During the early history of public
utilities it was thought that there was little need for regulation.! Gradually
state commissions were established to regulate railroad rates and the power
was extended to other utilities providing necessary public services. The
regulation of utility securities has been aimed primarily at preventing
overissuance, from which many evils were feared:
(1) excessive dividend or debt service requirements which might be
'United Air Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 32 Il1. 2d 516, 207 N.E.2d 433 (1965).
2 FINE, LAIssEz FAIRE AND TImE GENERAL WELFARE STATE 107-09 (1956).
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met at the expense of adequate maintenance or reserves, with resultant
reduction of quality of service to the public;'
(2) higher rates to consumers;
(3) undue profits to promoters;
(4) dilution of the value of outstanding securities;'
(5) dilution of earnings and securities values, to the detriment of the
utility's ability to obtain future capital;
(6) excessive dividend or debt service requirements which might be
defaulted with resultant adverse effects on the utility's credit,' or on its
ability to obtain (and the cost of raising) future capital; and perhaps even
(7) the financial failure of the utility through inability to meet debt
service requirements.
Although investor protection is considered, the principal emphasis is on
protection of the general public' and the utility, as evidenced by the
preoccupation with the capital structure as an influence on the cost of
capital.'
B. Blue Sky Laws Distinguished
Utility regulations should not be confused with the blue sky laws,
which are concerned with the investing public rather than the public as
a whole.! These laws employ various protective regulations to minimize
fraud in a securities offering. A corporation subject to the blue sky laws,
unless exempted, must register its securities in each state in which they
are to be sold."0 If a state finds the sale of securities to be inconsistent
3 For an interesting discussion of the pre-regulatory period, see JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS
ch. 8 (1962).
4 1 SPURR, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION 53-54 (1924). It was also
stated that:
those in control of railroads through stock ownership had too frequently directed
their thoughts and given their attention to the manipulation of the stock for specula-
tive purposes, rather than to the legitimate operation of the railroads for railroad
purposes. Id. at 47.
5Id. at 53-54.
'York Ry. v. State Pub. Util. Comm'n, 131 Pa. Super. 126, 198 At. 920, 922 (1938) (utility
regulation "does not refer to the general investing public"). See generally 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities
§ 43 (1951):
While such statutes [utility regulations] are not Blue Sky Laws in the generally
accepted sense, and the public for whose protection such statutes are primarily con-
cerned is the public which uses or desires to use the service of the utility company . . .
and which may be affected by the operation of the public utility and not the general
investing public, investors may benefit incidentally.
See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R. 891 (1926).
'Petition of Derry Electric Co., 180 Atd. 697, 700 (N.H. 1935). The court stated that the
"primary purpose of the Public Service Commission Law is the assurance to the public of reason-
able rates and service. . . . [T]he protection of investors also may be a factor." Accord, People
v. County Transp. Co., 303 N.Y. 391, 103 N.E.2d 421 (1952). The purpose of a utility statute is
to protect the public against the sudden deprivation of bus service. But see Electric Light Co. v. De-
partment of Pub. Util., 333 Mass. 536, 131 N.E.2d 922 (1956), and Venner v. Michigan R.R., 205
Mich. 573, 172 N.W. 567, 569 (1919), where the respective state utility statutes were looked upon
as being for the benefit of investors. The Michigan court stated that the purpose of their regulation
was to "protect the stockholders and investing public against the issue of securities for reckless and
unlawful expenditures."
s NICHOLS & WELCH, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION 144, Supp. A (1964).
'See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R. 42 (1933). 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 33 (2d ed. 1961).
Blue sky laws are divided into three types: (1) antifraud provisions, (2) provisions requiring the
registration or licensing of certain persons engaging in the securities business, and (3) provisions re-
quiring the registration or licensing of securities.
10CHOKA, AN INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES REGULATION 113 (1958).
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with its investor-protection standards, permission to sell in the state may
be denied." A state has authority under the police power to protect its
citizens from fraud and may freely exercise this power in the absence of
preemptive congressional regulation." While blue sky laws may prohibit
the sale of securities in a state, they do not bar the spending within the
state of money raised by sales in other states. Because the blue sky laws
only regulate the sale of securities within one jurisdiction,"a they have
been held an indirect burden on interstate commerce and hence valid."'
C. Present Regulations
Most jurisdictions have established public utility laws and commissions
to regulate their various public utilities and exempt them from their blue
sky laws.' The Illinois Public Utilities Act illustrates the assorted powers
of a commission. The act requires a utility to show the purpose for an
issuance of securities and the commission must be satisfied that the money
raised will not be applied toward operating expenses.1" Securities issued
without commission approval are declared void." The commission has the
power to enforce its orders by mandamus or injunction, s and a utility may
be fined for failure to obey an order. 9 A utility may also be fined for
applying the proceeds of a securities issuance in a manner contrary to the
act," which apparently includes a failure to obtain an order from the
commission. It seems that the effects of a blue sky law and a utility regula-
tion might differ. If under its utility regulations State A finds that a
securities issuance would result in an over-capitalization under local
standards, any sale of securities in State B would be illegal in the eyes of
State A. Since utility regulations are based on the utility's entire capital
structure, State A's determination might be binding on the corporation
in every state it operates in. It is also possible that a determination by one
"See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. ch. 4 S 25507 (Deering 1962).
If the commissioner finds that the proposed plan of business of the applicant and the
proposed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable, that the applicant intends
to transact its business fairly and honestly . . . the commissioner shall issue to the
applicant a permit.
A similar standard is found in the UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 306(2) E. & F. Two of the grounds
stated for denial, suspension and revocation of registration are:
E. The offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so
operate;
F. The offering has been or would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwrit-
ers' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters'
profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options.
"Mulhern v. Gerold, 116 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1953). 15 C.J.S. Commerce § 88 (1939).
131 Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 73, n.211 (2d ed. 1961). "Though most of the statutes
which contain any geographical reference say 'within this state' a few make it illegal to offer or
sell, without registration or fraudulently as the case may be, 'within or from this state.' " Ibid.
4 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). For a discussion on why such regulations
should be held to be a burden on interstate commerce, see Millonzi, Concurrent Regulations of Inter-
state Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reappraisal, 49 VA. L. REV. 1483 (1963).
" Loss & COWETT, BLUE SKY LAws 358 (1958). The authors state that it is common for most
states to exempt utilities from their blue sky laws. The Uniform Securities Act contains this ex-
emption in § 402 (a) (7).
"
0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112/ § 21 (Supp. 1965).
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1I11IY § 23 (1963).
"SILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1112/3 § 79 (Supp. 1965).
'"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%Y § 80 (1963).
"°ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111% § 24 (1963).
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state will prejudice the utility's issuance in other states. In any case, the
disapproving state will be able to prohibit the spending within the
state of the money raised by the sale of the securities in other states.
However, by contrast to the blue sky laws it appears that each state could
individually determine whether the securities of an interstate utility repre-
sent an over-capitalization, and a determination by one state would not
be binding on another or on the corporation." The discussion of utility
regulations and blue sky laws leads to a consideration of present state
power to regulate a securities issuance by an interstate utility.
D. The Case Law
An interstate utility is subject to the multiple regulations of the federal
government and of the states in which it does business. Each state has juris-
diction to act within its borders," but its acts may not directly burden
interstate commerce. 3 Most state cases concerning jurisdiction over the
issuance of securities by an interstate utility have not been decided on the
basis of federal constitutional law. These cases have generally turned on
two factors: (1) the interpretation of the local statute or (2) the utility's
investment within the state. Several courts have held that their statutes
exclude foreign utilities" or that the commission has jurisdiction only if
the utility is going to spend part of the money raised within the state,
and have not been forced to examine the ability of their commissions to
regulate the securities of a foreign utility. Some of the cases rest on a
factual finding of how extensive the investment of the utility is within
the state, how much of the money raised by the issue will be spent in the
state, or to what degree the state is attempting to regulate. An excellent
illustration is Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, where a Utah
railroad operated 6/10 of a mile of track in Missouri. The railroad had a
total property value of $280 million, $3 million of which was in Missouri.
The railroad was seeking to issue $30 million of bonds secured by its en-
tire line running through several states. The Missouri Commission ruled
that it had jurisdiction to authorize the issuance and to charge a fee on
the entire issue. On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that the
charging of a fee based on the entire issue was a "direct unconstitutional
2 If the United States Supreme Court treats the public utility commissions in the same manner
as the state security commissions, control could be exercised only within the state. In Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), the Court stated that the purpose of the blue sky law was to
regulate securities sold within the state and the burden on interstate commerce would be indirect.
This seems to indicate that a state regulation which attemped to control or regulate securities sold
outside the state would be unconstitutional.
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
24In the Matter of Fryeburg Water Co., 79 N.H. 123, 106 Atl. 225 (1919). The court held in
Fryeburg that the language of the statute was broad enough to include a foreign utility, but since
the issuing of stock is regulated by the laws of the incorporating state the court would not presume
that the legislature intended to give the commission the power to regulate the internal affairs of a
utility. Accord, Citizens Util. Co., 86 P.U.R. (n.s.) 59 (Me. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1950). Prior to
this decision Maine had held that it did have jurisdiction over the securities issuance of a foreign
utility in so far as disbursements were to be made in the state. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,
1923A P.U.R. 795 (Me. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1922).
"SWestern Union Tel. Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 151 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955).
2248 U.S. 67 (1918).
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interference with interstate commerce."" There was no finding that
Missouri lacked the power to regulate a foreign utility, only that the
state could not regulate the entire bond issue under the guise of a fee.
The Supreme Court has followed this reasoning in cases where a state
attempts to tax a foreign corporation on its net sales from all states,
or a tax on gathering gas measured by the entire volume of gas taken,
or where a state tries to impose a charter fee tax on the entire amount of
stock issued by a corporation." The apparent basis for holding unconstitu-
tional state taxes such as these is that, "interstate commerce would thus be
subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce
is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids."'" This same reason-
ing is found in some of the state decisions denying the state commission's
power to regulate a foreign utility. In these cases the utility provided
most of its service outside the state that was claiming the power to ap-
prove and levy a fee on the entire issue.3" Some courts have reasoned that
the issuance of securities by a foreign utility is subject only to the authority
of the incorporating state.3" While this is perhaps the better view because
of its simplicity, it is not universal and in some jurisdictions even the in-
corporating state refuses to exercise supervision." If the incorporating
state alone had the power to approve and assess fees on a utility's securities
issuance, there would be no double regulation or fee charging and appar-
ently no burden on interstate commerce. However, if the incorporating
state disclaims jurisdiction the utility would be relatively free to issue
securities with no state having regulatory power. One of the latest de-
cisions has pointed toward the direction of federal control over the securi-
ties issuance of an interstate utility when it held that the facts demon-
srated that a securities issuance by an interstate utility is a national problem
rather than a local one." Generally, the states find a lack of power to
regulate under their laws and are not faced with the question of using
the power.
III. A RECENT VIEW-UNITED AIR LINES, INC. v. ILLINOIS
COMMERCE COMM'N
Between 1956 and 1960, United Air Lines, a Delaware corporation
providing interstate service to 110 cities in thirty-two states, received
permission from the Illinois Commerce Commission to issue securities
consisting of unsecured notes, convertible and unconvertible debentures,
17 Id. at 68.
"j. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
"Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910). The court did say that the property
of an interstate corporation in a state may be taxed equally with other local property.
"J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
"Public Serv. Comm'n v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 121 Md. 179, 88 Atl. 348 (1913) (issuance by
domestic utility on entire system not subject to jurisdiction) ; Application of United Air Lines, 172
Neb. 748, 112 N.W.2d 414 (1961) (local interests only incidentally involved, if involved at all).
33 Southern Sierras Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 205 Cal. 479, 271 Pac. 747 (1928). Contra,
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
'People v. New York Cent. R.R., 233 N.Y. 679, 135 N.E. 967 (1922).
"0Application of United Air Lines, 172 Neb. 748, 112 N.W.2d 414 (1961).
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and preferred and common stock. During this period United made seven
separate security offerings, each time requesting that the Commission dis-
claim jurisdiction over the right to approve them and to assess fees.' In
each instance the Commission reserved the jurisdictional question. United's
only Illinois intrastate route, Chicago to Moline, represented 0.092 per
cent of its total passenger miles. The proceeds were used principally to
purchase equipment, none of which was applied to this route. In 1963, pur-
suant to section 21 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, 7 the Commission
asserted jurisdiction over the past issuances of the convertible debentures,
and the preferred and common stock, and the right to assess fees. The Com-
mission found that it had jurisdiction over these securities solely because
they created a property right in Illinois."s On appeal an Illinois circuit court
reversed holding that Illinois had no power to regulate the issuance of se-
curities by a foreign utility, and even if the state had the power, its exercise
would be an undue burden on interstate commerce. 9 The case is significant
because the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that Illinois has the
power to regulate the issuance of securities by a foreign utility to the
extent that the securities create an interest in Illinois property, but that
in this case it could not be exercised. The decision was based on sections
21 and 31 of the Public Utilities Act and the court's holding in Bowman
v. Armour & Co.' In 1951, section 21 of the act was changed to provide
that foreign utilities could issue securities without the Commission's ap-
proval if the securities do "not directly or indirectly constitute a lien or
charge on, or right to profits from, any property used or useful in render-
ing service within the state."4 Section 31 of the act was also amended at
this time to establish fees chargeable to a foreign utility in "the same
portion of the whole issue as the property situated in this State is of the
as Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., Illinois Commerce Commission Docket
No. 47380 (24 April 1963).
a' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%/ (1963), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. 111%Y (Supp. 1965). Public
utilities may issue securities in Illinois provided that they:
21. shall first have secured from the commission an order authorizing such issue and
stating the amount thereof and the purpose or purposes to which the issue or the
proceeds thereof are to be applied and that in the opinion of the commission, the
money, property or labor to be procured or paid for by such issue is reasonably
required for the purpose or purposes specified in the order, and that except as
otherwise permitted in the order in the case of notes or other evidence of in-
debtedness, such purpose or purposes are not, in whole or in part, reasonably
chargeable to operating expenses or to income.
Other pertient provisions of this chapter are:
10. "Public Utility" defined.
"Utility" means and includes every corporation, company, . . . that now or
hereafter:
(a) May own, control, operate or manage, within the State, directly or indirectly,
for public use, any plant, equipment or property used or to be used for or in
connection with the transportation of persons or property. ...
20. Power to issue stocks, bonds, etc.
The power of public utilities to issue stocks, stock certificates, bonds, notes and
other evidence of indebtedness and to create liens on their property is a special
privilege, the right of supervision, regulation . . . shall be exercised by the com-
mission.
s Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., Illinois Commerce Commission Docket
No. 47380, at 4 (24 April 1963).
"' United Air Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 32 111. 2d 516, 207 N.E.2d 433 (1965).
40 17 Ill. 2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 753 (1959).41 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111% § 21 (Supp. 1965).
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total property on which such securities issue creates a lien or charge." 2
The court in Bowman had ruled that a share of stock creates an indirect
right to profits within the state, and based on this decision the Commission
held that it had the power to approve the securities and to assess a fee. 3
United contended that the amount of fees "must constitutionally be
limited to that portion of the security issue in question represented by the
portion of United's Illinois interstate business to its total business."44
The Commission rejected this argument and ordered the hearings reopened
to determine what per cent of United's property was located in Illinois. 5
In reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the issuance of
securities by an interstate utility is a single act, and the issue can not be
"fractionalized and given portions allocated to specific states."'4 Each state
can not apply its own standards in approving the issuance of securities
to an interstate carrier such as United Air Lines, because "the result
. . . would be chaotic."47 The court further held that the local interest
involved in seeing that the service of the utility continue was outweighed
by the competing national interest in a free flow of commerce."8 The
opinion suggests that these two reasons are mutual and complementary.
However, if the issuance of securities can not be divided between the
states for approval, then it would presumably make no difference that the
court believed the issuance of securities by a utility is not a matter of
local interest. Possibly what the court was doing was to lay down the
following test for future cases: whenever a security issue covers many
states it can not be apportioned and it will never be a matter of local
interest. Conversely, when a security issue is made in one or possibly two
states it can be apportioned and it will be a matter of local concern. The
facts in United Air Lines v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n are similar to the
cases previously mentioned and the impression is conveyed that if the
local interests were strong enough the Commission could exercise the power
of approval over the securities issuance of an interstate utility. The ex-
tended discussion concerning the power of the Commission is an addi-
tional reason for believing that the court intended to limit its ruling to
situations involving a large interstate utility. Of course, a power that may
42ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill Y 31 (Supp. 1965). This is a percentage based on the ratio of the
intrastate property to the interstate property.
" Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., Illinois Commerce Commission Docket
No. 47380, at 7 (24 April 1963). "[We] feel that the language of section 21 imposes on us a duty
to pass on stock issues of foreign utility corporations doing business in Illinois since they do create
a right to profits from Illinois Utility property." The Commission had previously used this same
reasoning in Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 47 P.U.R.3d 103 (Ill. Com-
merce Comm'n 1962). A Delaware utility was seeking to issue stocks and bonds in Illinois. The
Commission stated that it could not assess fees based on the whole amount of a securities issue of
an interstate utility but only on the amount representing local property. Accordingly, jurisdiction
was taken over the stocks.
" Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., Illinois Commerce Commission Docket
No. 47380, at 9 (24 Apirl 1963). This would be a percentage of interstate business to intrastate
business.
45Id. at 10.
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not be exercised is an empty one, but it is possible that the power could
be exerted where an interstate utility plans to spend, within the state, a
large percentage of the money raised by a security issue or where the
utility operates a limited interstate service."' Between these extremes can
arise various situations, perhaps based on questions of degree, which the
Illinois court may have to decide in the future.
In United Air Lines v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, the Illinois Supreme
Court mentioned its own earlier decision' where it had said that Illinois
could not charge a fee on an entire security issue covering many states.
This prior holding was in accord with the previous holding of the United
States Supreme Court."1 These holdings illustrate with some certainty what
the states are unable to do in the area of a security issue by a foreign
utility. First, the states lack the power to charge a fee based on the entire
securities issuance of an interstate utility." Second, since the states are
unable to assess fees on an entire issue it would seem to follow that they
could not exercise the right to approve the issuance of such securities.
As a practical matter the states are probably only concerned with the
collection of fees rather than a gratuitous power to approve. Under these
limitations some states have taken steps to retain limited control over
the securities issuance of a foreign utility. As illustrated by the 1951
amendments to the Illinois Public Utilities Act interpreted in United Air
Lines, statutes have been passed which granted to the state utility com-
missions the power to approve and charge a fee to the extent that a securi-
ties issuance created property rights in the state. " Since the Illinois Supreme
Court accepted the dual premises that the state did have the power to
regulate an interstate utility when it issues securities, and that the stock"
created a property right in Illinois, the court could have upheld the Com-
mission's ruling as a case of regulating and controlling Illinois property
rights. However, the court chose to nullify the effect of the 1951 amend-
ments in this case rather than hold them unconstitutional per se. The
court stated, "to say that our Commission may assert jurisdiction in this
" People v. County Transp. Co., 303 N.Y. 391, 103 N.E.2d 421 (1952). A New York statute
required approval from the public service commission before a utility could issue securities. The
court upheld the statute in its application to a domestic bus line whose only interstate route was
from New York City to Connecticut.
S"Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 292 Ill. 427, 127 N.E. 41 (1920). A Missouri
utility sought to issue bonds on its entire line, serving nine states with 6,785 miles of track. The
utility's total property value was $380 million, $11 million of which was in Illinois.
" Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
52 Ibid.
53 See note 21 supra.
" See MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 208 § 22.11 (1937). In Michigan, when a utility issues securities
on property located partly within and partly without the state, a fee is placed on the proportion
of the entire issue as the amount of such property within the state bears to the total amount of the
property upon which the securities are issued. Michigan does take jurisdiction over a securities issu-
ance by a foreign utility. See Verner v. Michigan R.R., 205 Mich. 573, 172 N.W. 567 (1919);
Peninsular Power Co. v. Secretary of State, 169 Mich. 595, 135 N.W. 656 (1912). A Wisconsin
railroad sought to issue securities in Michigan in order to make improvements within the state and
was required to obtain the approval of the state commission. Contra, Chicago, N.S. & M.R.R., 54
P.U.R. (n.s.) 315 (Wis. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1944).
"United Air Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 32 111. 2d 516, 207 N.E.2d 433, 437
(1965). The court did not mention the convertible debentures, but stated that "we hold that the
stocks issued were not exempt."
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case is to allow it to intrude into an area of overwhelmingly predominant
national interest."' "
IV. SHOULD THE STATES REGULATE?
In United Air Lines v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n the court left open
the power of the Illinois Commerce Commission in future cases. Whether
a state should have any control over a securities issuance by an interstate
utility and if so, to what extent, is an especially pertinent question in the
air transportation industry, where new equipment must constantly be
purchased. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this when it said that
if United could not secure funds by selling securities "its continued exist-
ence in the highly competitive interstate air transportation industry would
be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain."" This might not be the case
where a public utility conducts limited interstate operations. There, as one
court found, the national interests may be minute.5" However, the national
interest in maintaining a free flow of interstate commerce is extremely
prevalent in the case of the larger interstate utilities. Allowing each state
to pass on a securities issuance of such a utility and to apportion the fees
chargeable would result in a burden on interestate commerce. The burden
would arise, not only from the delay involved, but in the effect one state's
refusal would have on the utility's interstate operations. The denial of
the selling of the securities or the spending of the proceeds by one state
might adversely affect the flow of commerce between all the states. By
its very nature a securities transaction of this type can never be local,
even if the interstate utility is a domestic utility or plans to spend a large
part of the money raised by the securities within the state that is attempt-
ing to regulate the issuance. In either case the issuance would directly
affect the entire interstate operation. The states can best serve the public
by disclaiming jurisdiction over a security issuance by an interstate utility
because of the national interest involved. When one state applies its own
local standard to a capital structure covering many states the determina-
tion may not be in the best interests of the other sates. In addition, the
necessity for each state to scrutinize a security issuance by an interstate
utility no longer seems to exist. This is because of modern communications,
corporation disclosure requirements, the general filing and disclosure rules
of the different federal governmental agencies before securities may be
issued, more public responsibility on the part of management, and the fact
that utilities are already heavily regulated. Based on such factors, the added
requirement of seeking approval from each state, may not serve to further
protect and benefit the public or the utility.
One possible solution to the question of who should regulate the securi-
ties issuance of an interstate utility would be to allow the federal agency
that sets the utilities tariffs to pass on its securities. This would have the
56d. at 438. (Emphasis added.)
11 Id. at 437.
"People v. County Transp. Co., 303 N.Y. 391, 103 N.E.2d 421 (1952).
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desired benefit of combining both fuctions in the one agency capable of
examining all aspects of the utility. This is currently the procedure fol-
lowed by the Interstate Commerce Commission as to interstate railroads
and certain other carriers." The Commission approves each securities
issuance by a railroad and the various states affected have the right to
intervene and present their views on the issuance."0 In the case of an air-
line at the present time, the Civil Aeronautics Board sets its interstate
rates,"' the various states it serves set the intrastate rates,2 it must meet the
general filing and disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933,"
and the possibility exists that various states will regulate any securities it
may issue. By bringing all these factors under one authority, simplicity
would be served.
It may be that what the states are concerned with is not the authority
to regulate but rather the power to charge a fee. If the question of state
approval is divorced from the question of the charging of fees based on
property interests within the state, the problem is greatly simplified. A
fee might be apportioned among the states where the securities are to be
issued in proportion to the utility's property values in each state. Other
possible formulas would be the proportion of the utility's intrastate service
to its total business, or an apportionment based on sales within the state.
Such an apportionment standard would follow the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in the cases of state income taxation of corporations en-
gaged in interstate commerce," but would require a sophisticated applica-
tion to insure that there is no multiple taxation of the same property
between the states.6 For example, in the case of a common carrier, which
state could include the value of an airplane for purposes of taxation?
Would it be State A where the airplane is usually stationed or State B
where it usually flies? If both states claim the value of the airplane in order
to establish a percentage basis on which to set a fee for a proposed securi-
ties issuance the utility would be paying a double tax, unless there is
59 Interstate Commerce Act § 1-27, 63 Stat. 487 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1-27 (1964).
°interstate Commerce Act § 20a(6), 63 Stat. 487 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 20a(6) (1964).
Upon receipt of any such application for authority to issue securities the Commission
shall cause notice thereof to be given to and a copy filed with the governor of each
state in which the applicant carrier operates. The Railroad commission, public service
or utilities commission, or other appropriate State authorities of the State, shall have
the right to make before the Commission such representations as they may deem just
and proper ...
61 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403, 74 Stat. 445, 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1964).
(2'People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859
(1954).
6348 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-mm (1964).
e
4 Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). The state tax on the portion
of net income earned within the state by a corporation engaged in interstate commerce was held
not to be an undue burden on interstate commerce. The state used three methods to find the pro-
portion of intrastate business to interstate business: (1) the proportion of corporate sales in the
state to total sales, (2) the proportion of corporate property used in the state to the total business
property, and (3) the proportion of the corporate payroll in the state to the total payroll.
"
5 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954). The difficulties of
apportionment are illustrated by the following passage:
It is now well settled that a tax imposed on a local activity related to interstate com-
merce is valid, if and only if, the local activity is not such an integral part of the
interstate process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot [sic) realistically be separated
from it. ...
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found to be a double use. For an apportionment system of fees to be
applied, it appears that the same assessment system and basis would have
to be used by each state."
V. CONCLUSION
Most states will not take jurisdiction over a securities issuance of a
foreign utility, and in some cases over a domestic utility. Because of this
it may well be that securities of an interstate utility no longer need to be
examined for a potential over-capitalization. If so they could be treated
as any other securities under the blue sky laws, with due regard to the
protection of investors. This would involve elimination of the present
exceptions for utility securities from the blue sky laws. Because of the
importance of interstate utilities to the public, perhaps the conservative
solution would be to place utility securities regulation under a single
governmental agency. This for the most part would take nothing from
the states but would insure the continued service of the utility.
James Knox Murphey III
"Such a uniform apportionment system for taxation of interstate corporations has been proposed
in H.R. No. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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NOTES
Administrative Law - Indirect Air Carriers -
Interagency Conflict
Prior to new regulations issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission,'
indirect air carriers were exempt from economic regulation by the ICC
so long as they performed a bona fide collection and delivery or transfer
service within the terminal areas described in tariffs filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board. In practice, the ICC accepted as reasonable any termi-
nal approved by the CAB.2 The statutory basis for the exemption is Sec-
tion 203 (b) (7a) of the Interstate Commerce Act.' The new regulations
limited terminal areas of indirect air carriers to a radius of twenty-five
miles from an airport. If, under these regulations, an indirect air carrier
wishes to service points outside this limit, its application will now be inde-
pendently reviewed by the ICC after CAB approval is obtained.4 Although
the CAB's approval will be considered, it will not be binding; thus, the
ICC will be the final arbiter of whether such indirect air carrier service
falls within the section 203 (b) (7a) exemption from regulation. (The
CAB voluntarily disclaimed jurisdiction in the matter and adopted the
regulations proposed for it by the ICC.') Plaintiff Air Dispatch, Inc., an
' On 4 May 1964, after proper rule-making procedure in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 5§ 1001-11 (1964), the ICC adopted the report,
order, and regulations entitled, Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by
Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71 (1964). The regulations adopted are set out in 49 C.F.R. §§ 210.40,
404.1, and 14 C.F.R. § 222 (1964). This discussion will be limited to motor transportation of
property incidental to air transportation. The problem of motor transportation of passengers inci-
dental to transportation by air is dealt with in a similar proceeding, Motor Transportation of
Passengers Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, ICC Order No. MC-C-4000 (1964). Discus-
sions of the § 203 (b) (7a) exemption as it relates to passengers appear in Haltom Corp., Common
Carrier Application, 91 M.C.C. 725 (1962) and Sky Freight Delivery Service, Inc., Common
Carrier Application, 47 M.C.C. 229 (1947).
"The air carriers now establish their own terminal area limits by the filing of tariffs with
the CAB, and our interpretation of the exemption . . . is based on the assumption that that agency
would not hesitate to reject any publication which would result in an unreasonable enlargement of
such an area." Kenny Extension-Air Freight, 61 M.C.C. 587 (1953).
352 Stat. 1237 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(7a) (1964).
449 C.F.R. § 210.40(c) (1964). This is not the first instance of an overlap in authority
between regulatory bodies. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 194 F. Supp. 31 (1961),
wherein a labor dispute caused this same type of problem between the NLRB and the ICC. The
uncertainties created by divided authority as between the President and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission in the field of spectrum allocation are discussed in Rosenblum, Low Visibility
Decision-making by Administrative Agencies: The Problem of Radio Spectrum Allocation, 18
AD. L. REv. 19 (1965). See also, Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
s 14 C.F.R. § 222 (1964). The CAB instituted a proceeding to review their prior rule of thumb
procedure in granting terminal areas at approximately the same time the ICC began its proceeding.
26 Fed. Reg. 8037 (1964). This proceeding was terminated when the CAB adopted the new ICC
regulations.
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air freight forwarder or indirect air carrier,' and intervenor plaintiffs'
brought suit against the United States and the ICC to have the ICC's re-
port, order, and regulations set aside. A temporary restraining order was
issued by a three-judge court until a final decision could be made.' Held:
It is the function of the ICC, rather than the CAB, to determine the scope
of the section 203 (b) (7a) exemption.! Air Dispatch, Inc. v. United States,
237 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd without opinion, 381 U.S. 412
(1965).
The regulation of air transportation began with the Air Commerce Act
of 192610 which defined "air commerce" as transportation "in whole or in
part by aircraft of persons or property for hire."1 Subsequently, the Inter-
state Commerce Act was amended by the addition of the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935." For the purpose of motor vehicle regulation, interstate
commerce was defined in the act as commerce between states "whether
such commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly by motor vehicle
and partly by rail, express, or water."'" The Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938,'* enacted three years later, is important here in three respects. After
heated discussions, the CAB was given control of air transportation as
defined in the act." Secondly, the definitions of air transportation and air
commerce were substantially the same as those in the act of 1926.' Finally,
section 1107(j) of the act amended the Interstate Commerce Act by
6 An air freight forwarder, or indirect air carrier, performs the service of pickup and delivery,
or transfer, to and from the direct air carrier of shipments in a continuous line-haul movement on
a through bill of lading issued by either the direct or indirect carrier.
'The intervenor plaintiffs were Air Freight Forwarders Association; Film Carrier Conference,
Air Transport Association; and National Film Carriers, Inc. Several defendants were also allowed
to intervene: American Trucking Association, National Motor Freight Traffic Association, National
Bus Traffic Association, and National Association of Motor Bus Owners.
8 A three-judge court is required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2284, 2321-25 (1964).
' The court further held that any other question of the reasonableness of the regulations or
possible conflict between the ICC and the CAB was premature since no attack had been made on
the reasonableness of the Commission's action and since no conflict had actually arisen. These pre-
cise points were raised and answered three months later, the court holding the regulations reasonable
and finding no interagency conflict. Wycoff v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 304 (D. Utah 1965).
'
0 Ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
" Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 1, 44 Stat. 568 (1926). This definition was re-
enacted in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, tit. I, § 101 (3) & (10), 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C.
1301(3) & (10) (1964).
5549 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964).
' Interstate Commerce Act, S 263(a)(10), 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(10) (1964).
There seems to be a difference in opinion as to whether this provision is to be construed restrictively
or collectively. The plaintiff argued that: (1) through the application of the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another"; and (2) be-
cause of the fact that nine years earlier Congress had defined air commerce as transportation "in
whole or in part by aircraft," without any limitation on other modes of transportation to be in-
cluded, Congress could not be said to have made an omission on the theory that transportation by
aircraft was not, at that time, sufficiently important to exclude. Brief for Plaintiffs, p.13, Air Dis-
patch, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The court, however, did not
discuss this question but merely pointed out that the defendants had argued that the term "ex-
press" mentioned in the definition meant "air express" as it was known in 1935. Id. at 452, n.6.
14 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
is Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 1, 52 Stat. 973, 977. It is interesting to note that
Congress was perplexed over whether to give jurisdiction over air transportation to the ICC or
the new board proposed in the bill. This is especially interesting in view of President Johnson's re-
cent recommendation for a Cabnet-level Transportation Department combining all transportation
into one agency for certain purposes. He further suggested reorganization of several of the existing
agencies. State of the Union Message, 112 CONG. REc. 129 (1966).
'6Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
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adding to part II, section 203 (b) (7a), the exemption in question.17 This
section states:
Nothing in this part, [except certain safety provisions of section 204]
shall be construed to include . . . the transportation of persons or property
when incidental to transportation by aircraft ....
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958" repealed the Air Commerce Act of
1926'" and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 ° but retained their defini-
tions of air commerce and air transportation. The act, essentially a codifi-
cation of all previous air transportation regulatory laws, sets out, among
others, the following duties of the CAB: (1) to regulate commerce, which
is "wholly by aircraft or partly by aircraft and partly by other modes of
transportation";1 (2) to control the ground gathering and delivery serv-
ice in connection with air transportation;2 ' and (3) to regulate the issuance
of certificates of operating authority, and in all other ways to economically
regulate the overall system of air transportation in the United States. 3
The leading administrative decision in the area of section 203 (b) (7a)
is Kenny Extension-Air Freight' which established the extent of the
exemption. The Kenny doctrine previously stood for the proposition that
motor carrier service is exempt from economic regulation by the ICC so
long as: (1) it is a shipment of goods having immediately prior or subse-
quent movement by direct air carrier; (2) it is part of a continuous line-
haul movement under a through bill of lading issued by either a direct or
an indirect air carrier; and (3) such service is performed within the
terminal area of either the direct or indirect air carrier according to its
tariff.2 This case has been uniformly followed by the ICC.0 The ICC re-
fused to put an absolute mileage limitation on the extent of the air freight
forwarder's terminal area, preferring instead to rely on the wisdom and
discretion of the CAB in granting terminal areas."' In City of Philadelphia
17 2 Stat. 1029 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (7a) (1964).
172 Stat. 731 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
172 Stat. 806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. 5 1401(a) (1964).
2072 Stat. 806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. 5 1401(b) (1964).
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101 (20) (c), 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (20) (c)
(1964).
2' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403 (a) & (b), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (a) & (b)
(1964).
23 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 102, 401, 72 Stat. 740, 754, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1371
(1964). The plaintiffs argued that, by an overall reading of the statute, the connotation of
exclusive regulation is present. This does not seem to be an altogether unwarranted inference;
however, the court apparently did not agree as the issue was not specifically discussed.
2461 M.C.C. 587 (1953). The defendant in the instant case claimed that the new regulations
were merely a codification of the Kenny doctrine. The court seemed to implicitly uphold that
contention.
, At the time of the Kenny decision, the air freight forwarder was not considered an indirect
air carrier, but this distinction was abolished in Panther Cartage Co. Extension-Air Freight,
88 M.C.C. 37 (1961).
"This seemed to be a workable plan at the time, and there has been little, if any, difficulty in
its application. See, e.g., Panther Cartage Co. Extension-Air Freight, supra note 25.
27 The CAB's "rule of thumb" in consideration of the reasonableness of a terminal area was a
twenty-five mile radius from an airport. Any application for a larger area required specific proof
as to reasonableness along with a showing of public convenience and necessity. This is substantially
the same procedure followed to date. Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation
by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71, 89 (1964).
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v. CAB,"' the Flying Tiger Line, in compliance with its CAB certificate
of public convenience and necessity, proposed to service Philadelphia by
motor carrier from the Newark airport, some ninety miles away. Formerly,
the service had been provided by small, "feeder" planes. The change was
necessitated by the proposed use of jets which could not land at the
Philadelphia airport. The CAB said that the motor transportation between
Newark and Philadelphia was "air transportation" within the meaning of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.29 The court, however, in upholding the
decision that the motor service was "air transportation" insofar as Flying
Tiger's certificate was concerned, quoted with approval the Board's dis-
claimer of jurisdiction in the matter of whether such service was "inci-
dental to transportation by aircraft" within the meaning of section
203 (b) (7a).-0
In the instant case, plaintiffs argued that section 203 (b) (7a) is an ex-
plicit legislative exclusion from ICC regulation, and thus dispositive of the
case because if an area is excluded from regulation rather than exempted,
it is logical to require the agency which is to regulate the excluded portion
to determine the scope of the exclusion." The court, however, passed over
the issue by reference in a footnote saying that the "semantic battle" was
resolved in favor of the term exemption." Plaintiffs further contended
that there is a conflict between legislative intent, pointing toward exclusive
jurisdiction of the CAB over transportation "wholly or partly by air,"
and the case law which indicates at least partial jurisdiction in the ICC.33
In resolving the conflict, plaintiffs argued, the court should follow the
congressional intent that the CAB exclusively regulate all air transporta-
tion." The argument is strengthened because the exemption was added by
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938."5 Since the purpose of that act was
the establishment and regulation of a national system of air transporta-
tion,a" this, according to plaintiffs, demands exclusive regulation by the
CAB because the burden of the success of the system rests on the CAB.
28 289 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1961). This case was erroneously construed by the plaintiffs as its
application is clearly limited by the partial quote of the Board's opinion. See note 30 infra.
21City of Philadelphia v. CAB, 389 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
30 Id. at 774:
Our finding goes no further than that Flying Tiger Line's proposed service will,
as to it, constitute air transportation. . . . We are not asserting jurisdiction over the
motor carrier as an air carrier, nor are we determining the status of the truck opera-
tion under the Interstate Commerce Act. Whether the . . . truck haul should be con-
sidered as incidental to air transportation within the meaning of the Interstate
Commerce Act, and thereby exempt from economic regulation under that statute, is
a matter for the Interstate Commerce Commission. We do not intend that our action
here should influence what that decision should be. If the Commission should con-
clude under the standards normally applied by it that the truck operation is not
exempt, the trucker must have or obtain the requisite ICC authority in order for
Flying Tiger Line to operate in the manner it proposes.
st Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 13, at 20.
" Air Dispatch, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 450, 451 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
as According to City of Philadelphia v. CAB, supra note 29, the ICC must determine whether
a given motor carrier service is within or without the § 203 (b) (7a) exemption. It is interesting
to note that the disclaimer of jurisdiction by the CAB seemingly indicates a belief that it lacked
jurisdiction, but the question was not decided since the court was not squarely faced with the issue.
"4 It will be remembered that the definition used here is transportation "wholly or partly by
air." See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
a 5 2 Stat. 973 (1938).
3eSee 83 CON. REc. Parts 6-8 (1938).
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The exemption, taken in the context in which it arose, exempts from
regulation that transportation which is incidental to "transportation by
aircraft" as defined in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938."7 Thus, the
contention is that the foregoing precludes the determination of that which
is incidental to transportation by aircraft by any agency other than the
CAB. The court again reasoned to the contrary by citing the several
examples of safety, employees' hours and working conditions, etc., as
areas over which the ICC has exclusive regulatory power. The court
assumed that "the Commission also has authority to economically regulate
all motor vehicles except when the motor vehicles are used exclusively in
the collection, delivery, or transfer of goods incidental to transportation
by aircraft."'" According to the court, it follows that if the ICC has the
exclusive power to regulate all motor vehicles except in those cases ex-
empted by section 203 (b) (7a), it must necessarily have the power to
determine the scope of that exemption.
The Air Dispatch decision appears to be legally sound, although prac-
tically, some difficulties will arise. There will be a duplication of agency
action on any application for a terminal area beyond a twenty-five mile
radius" of the airport because of mandatory ICC review. There could be
an undue burden on the applicant, in legal fees alone, if he must satisfy
two agencies on the same application. The plaintiffs argued that the new
regulations will require them to use ICC certificated carriers for services
previously performed by themselves. They offered fast and efficient twenty-
four hour service on a through bill of lading, with sole responsibility of
loss to the shipper. With the restrictions imposed by the new regulations,
much of this service may be put to an end. For example, if an air freight
forwarder wishes to make a delivery outside his terminal area and must
use an ICC certificated carrier for this purpose, responsibility for the ship-
ment must be assumed by the ICC certificated carrier." This added re-
striction on the forwarder does not seem to be within the congressional
scheme of a well-ordered and efficient air transportation system. It is
therefore submitted that the possibility of a conflict in jurisdiction does
exist in this area,4' and that there is need for congressional reexamination of
the entire area to clarify which agency is to have jurisdiction over motor
transportation incidental to transportation by air.
Daniel L. Penner
3752 Stat. 973 (1938).
38 237 F. Supp. at 458.
"'49 C.F.R. § 210.40 (c) (1964).
40 In the view of the author, there is also some question as to whether or not under the new
regulations the goods may be shipped on a through bill of lading.
"' Although the court suggested the use of a joint CAB and ICC board to correct any possible
conflict, 237 F. Supp. at 452 n.5, the attempted use of the joint board has subsequently been dis-
allowed. Railway Express Agency v. CAB, 345 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Insurance - Aviation Exclusion Clauses - Judicial
Interpretation
The deceased was killed while a passenger on an airplane owned and
operated by Compagnie Nationale Air France (Air France). The flight
was pursuant to a contract' entered into between Air France and the
Atlanta Art Association of which the deceased was a member, and it was
identified by a regularly scheduled and published Air France flight num-
ber.' Air France did not maintain scheduled flights to Atlanta, but a flight
originating in Houston stopped in Atlanta, allowed the Association mem-
bers to board, then flew to Paris via New York. The return flight crashed
on takeoff at Orly Field, Paris. The defendant insurer denied liability for
accidental death under the certificate of insurance held by the plaintiff's
survivors. Defendant alleged that the death came within an exclusion
clause in the certificate.' Held: The contract between Air France and the
Association was a mere contract of affreightment and the aircraft was not
a chartered aircraft within the meaning of the exclusion clause. Further,
the Air France flight was held to be a scheduled passenger service and not
within the exclusion clause. Dorsey v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 238 F.
Supp. 391 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
The most universally accepted rule applicable to the construction of
exclusion clauses is that if conditions, limitations, and exceptions affecting
the liability of an insurer are not expressed clearly and without ambiguity,
they will be construed strictly against the insurer in favor of the insured.4
However, the courts are not at liberty, even in light of the rule favoring
liberal construction in behalf of the insured, to create a contract which
the parties did not make themselves nor to impose on a party an obligation
' The contract, executed on 2 February 1962, was entitled "International Charter Flight Agree-
ment."
' The regular flight from Paris to New York to Houston carried the number 007 in the schedule
which was used for the flights on Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday. The flight number 707 was used
to designate flights on Monday, Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday which originates in Paris, flying
to Mexico by way of New York. The tickets for the flight in the instant case carried the number
0707. It was explained by a representative of Air France that an additional digit (0) is added to
the regular flight number whenever the flight is to depart from the regular route. Although the
flight number in the contract was 007, the number on the tickets was 0707. Air France personnel
said the use of the wrong number was merely a clerical error.
a The certificate contained the following exclusion, interpretation of which constituted the mat-
ter in controversy:
No benefits shall be payable for any loss which is caused or contributed to by . . .
being in or on or in contact with any kind of aircraft, either on the ground, water
or in the air, or falling or in any other manner descending with or from such air-
craft, except loss resulting from flight or travel as a passenger in a licensed aircraft
(other than a chartered aircraft) operated by a licensed pilot on a scheduled passenger
service regularly offered between specified airports by a passenger carrier duly licensed
by the proper licensing authority. . ..
4 Burns v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 79 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd, 179 F.2d 236
(6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 947 (1950). See also 2 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE
971 (2d ed. 1927).
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it did not voluntarily assume.' Parties to a contract are presumed to have
reached an agreement as to its terms, and in the absence of an ambiguous
term, a court cannot revise the contract while professing to construe it!
In considering the construction of an insurance policy, words should
be given their usual and ordinarily accepted meanings. When ascertaining
the intent of the parties to an insurance contract, "courts must consider
the meaning as applied to the subject matter with regard to which the
language was used, and with reference to the object to be accomplished by
the contracting parties."' Public policy is another guide used by the courts
in construing exclusion clauses. The public policy argument appears to
have been on the side of the insurance companies during the first three
decades of this century. Such terms as "engaging in aeronautics" or "par-
ticipating in aeronautics" were construed against the insured by the courts.
Apparently, the courts were influenced by the general public opinion that
anyone who ascended in an airplane, as pilot or passenger, was assuming a
risk.' With the growth of air travel and its acceptance as a common mode
of transportation, the general public and the courts rejected the contention
that air transportation was an exceptional risk.' Life and accident policies
today have common or standard exclusion clauses limiting coverage to
accepted modes of air transportation. Although one will probably never
find a court basing its entire decision on a public policy argument, it is
often used as a basis for a finding of ambiguity where none appears to
exist. This practice seems motivated by the general public feeling that
large insurance companies can bear losses better than the individual."
Since the phrase "chartered aircraft"" has been before the courts in
few instances, one must look to maritime case law dealing extensively
with chartered vessels to determine its meaning. In United States v.
Hvoslef," the Court held that there are two different methods of entering
a contract of charter. A charterer can take possession and control of the
vessel, or he can contract for special services to be rendered by the owner
who maintains possession and control. The former contract is one in the
nature of a demise, while the latter is in the nature of a contract of
affreightment."' The pertinent point to be derived from the classification of
charters is that the former places possession and control in the hands of
the charterer, and the latter does not. In Curtiss-Wright Flying Serv., Inc.
'Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1 (1886). See also 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 242 (1946).
'Express Cases, supra note 5.
'McBride v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 461, 72 N.E.2d 98, 99 (1947).
'Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 N.J.L. 533, 112 A. 859 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921). The policy
contained an exclusion of the insurer's liability for injuries "sustained by the insured while partici-
pating in or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics." From the adopted opinion by
Justice Donges of the lower court, one can sense the public and judicial distrust of air flight: "I
have no doubt that the insurance company intended to provide against liability in case of injuries
to persons who navigate the air, a means of transportation still regarded as extremely hazardous."
'Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1939). See
generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1041 (1951); 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 695 (1949).
"0Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 Misc. 887, 52 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944).
' See note 3 supra.
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v. Glose," the court held that one who purchased a ticket for an airplane
journey, during which he was killed when the plane crashed, was not a
charterer of the aircraft but was a passenger."8 The decision was based on
the reservation of power or control of the flight in the owner and operator
of the aircraft. While the definition of a "chartered aircraft" is still
nebulous, it seems that the court considers one to have chartered an aircraft
when possession and control passes to him. One who merely contracts for
special charter transportation by way of an airplane is a passenger under
a contract of affreightment.
The phrase "scheduled passenger service"" has not been litigated to any
great extent although similar phrases have received attention by the courts.
In Weisman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., " the court held that a "regularly
scheduled route between definitely established airports" should convey to
a man of ordinary understanding, applying the rules of common sense, the
idea that normal air travel would be included in the policy coverage, but
unusual hazards such as private flights or barnstorming tours would be
excluded. 9 The Ohio supreme court has held that the phrase "regularly
scheduled passenger flight" meant only those flights which were open to
the public, were operated at definite intervals from one definitely establish-
ed airport to another.' In Little v. Globe Indem. Co.,21 an airline company,
prior to the accident, had been awarded a route by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority. Although it was not an established passenger route at the time
of the accident, the court held that the phrase "a scheduled trip over an
established passenger route" could be reasonably construed to fit the situa-
tion, saying "the insured was accidentally killed while a passenger in an
aircraft owned and operated by a common carrier for passenger service,
on a scheduled trip, over an established passenger route of such carrier,
and thus the facts measure up to the language and establish liability.'
2
In view of the preceding cases, it appears that the standards used by the
courts in defining "scheduled passenger service" are (1) a normal air
flight considered as such by an ordinary man, (2) a flight between two
definite points,'2 (3) a definite interval between flights," and (4) a com-
mercial type of air transportation.
In the instant case, the court considered the exclusion clause to be am-
biguous with reference to the parenthetical phrase "chartered aircraft,"
because of the two possible connotations of the word charter. The court
found that the Association, by entering into an International Charter
5 66 F.2d 710 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 696 (1933).
"6 Ibid.
17 See note 3 supra.
'8 67 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd without opinion, 273 App. Div. 761, 75 N.Y.S.2d
653 (1947).
'1 Ibid.
"1McBride v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 461, 72 N.E.2d 98, 99 (1947).
"1 13 Life Cas. 1048, 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
2 id.
2See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
24See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
" Ibid.
26 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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Flight Agreement" with Air France, had merely contracted for charter
air transportation. It appears that the court looked more to the substance
of the contract between the Association and Air France than to the form.'
The district court found in the phrase "chartered aircraft" a conflict be-
tween one taking command and possession of the aircraft and one who
merely contracted for charter transportation (i.e., a charter for a special
service to be rendered by the owner of the aircraft or more specifically a
contract of affreightment). This ambiguity in the wording of the exclusion
clause was construed in favor of the insured in conformity with the uni-
versal rules of insurance and contract law. 9
The phrase "scheduled passenger service" appears to be the more nebulous
of the two phrases under consideration. This exact phrase was being
litigated for the first time, so the court used the interpretations of similar
phrases in construing it. Since the flights to and from Paris were flights
Air France normally offered as scheduled flights to the public, the court
said that the flight could reasonably be interpreted to be a "scheduled pas-
senger service," and that the Association had merely preempted the public
sale of tickets for the particular flight.
A question left unanswered and not dealt with by the court is the
possibility of a crash between Atlanta and New York. Air France does not
maintain scheduled flights between the two cities. In light of the court's
rationale in construing "chartered aircraft" favorably for the insured,
and in light of the reliance on Littlea' to define "scheduled passenger serv-
ice," it is possible that recovery might have been allowed for a crash
between Atlanta and New York. Public opinion of air travel is a strong
factor enhancing this possibility. Because of the technological development
of aircraft, air travel is at an all-time high as reflected by the number
of passengers flying, as well as by the number of passenger air miles being
flown.2 ' A correlative feature of this seems to be the courts' liberal inter-
pretation of aviation exclusion clauses.2"
With the increase in air travel by commercial and charter flights, in-
surance companies must take cognizance of need for clearer and more
specific statements concerning coverage and exclusions in their policies.
The courts, on the other hand, must equitably and legally resolve the
ambiguities in the policies when and if they appear. Since the principal case
involves issues adjudicated for the first time, the decision might indicate
the course of future holdings in the judicial construction of the phrases
considered.
Patrick 0. Waddel
" In outlining the respective contractual obligations between the parties, the term "charter" or
"charterer" is used numerous times.
"Rose v. Osborne, 136 Me. 15, 1 A.2d 225, 226 (1938).
"9 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
a0 13 Life Cas. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
31 11-1 CAB Air Carrier Traffic Statistics 1 (Feb. 1964 -Jan. 1965). See also The Wall Street
Journal, 24 Sept. 1965, p. 9, col. 3. The CAB recently intimated that the time may be at hand
for permitting non-scheduled airlines to fly charter tours.
" Quinones v. Life & Cas. Co., 209 La. 76, 24 So. 2d 270 (1945). See also Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d
1041 (1951).
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Torts - Admiralty Jurisdiction - Air Space Over the Sea
Libelants brought a suit in admiralty to recover damages for personal
injuries allegedly sustained while one libelant was a passenger on respond-
ent's aircraft during a flight over the high seas. Libelants alleged that the
injuries were the direct result of respondent's negligence in failing to
provide a reasonably safe passage. In a motion to dismiss, the respondent
contended that the aircraft in which the accident occurred made no con-
tact with the water and that, therefore, admiralty was not the proper
forum for the action. Held, motion denied: The fact that the aircraft
made no contact with the water is immaterial. Admiralty is the proper
forum for tort injuries occurring in the air space above the high seas.
Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa.
1965).
Courts of the United States derive their admiralty jurisdiction from the
Constitution, which provides that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."' Con-
gress has given federal district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction
in all civil admiralty and maritime cases.2 It has been the function of the
courts to determine the bounds and scope of the phrase "admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction." The weight of judicial authority is that the "lo-
cality test" is the basis of admiralty tort jurisdiction.' This test was
originally announced in The Plymouth in 1865:
The [tort] jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact that
the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality-the high
seas.... Every species of tort, however occurring .. . if upon the high seas
or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.4
Later courts questioned whether more than mere maritime locality was
required to bring a tort action within the jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts,' but in 1929 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Plymouth doc-
trine.'
The locality test is also applied to determine admiralty jurisdiction under
' U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
228 U.S.C. § 1333(l) (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
3See Comment, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 243 (1958).
470 U.S. (3 Wall) 20, 36 (1865).
5Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co., 125
Fed. 696 (9th Cir. 1903).
6 London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109 (1929). It seems to
be still unsettled whether any tort whatever, occurring on navigable waters, is within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction. Certainly the courts have used language broad enough. See generally GILMORE
& BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 1-10 (1957 ed.).
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the Death on the High Seas Act.' In Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana,'
the plaintiff brought suit on the civil side of the district court, but claimed
a right of action under the act since the decedent died in a crash in the
Atlantic. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the cause of action created by the act is cognizable only in admiralty,
and dismissed.! Jurisdiction in admiralty was accepted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Trihey v. Transocean Airlines,
Inc.," a suit under the act where plaintiff's decedent died in a crash in the
Pacific Ocean." In Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.," a 1963 wrongful
death action arising from a crash of an aircraft in the Boston Harbor,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, accepting
admiralty jurisdiction, said that "the weight of authority is clearly to
the effect that locality alone determines whether or not a tort claim is
within the admiralty jurisdiction.""
The jurisdiction of admiralty courts has been extended to fill a part
of the legal vacuum created by travel into areas previously not within
the jurisdiction of any particular court. Although the Death on the High
Seas Act was passed to afford a uniform remedy for deaths occurring "on
the high seas," 14 deaths occurring in a submarine under the seas were held
within its scope." Also, in Choy v. Pan American Co.," an action for re-
covery under the act for death as a result of a plane crash in the Atlantic
Ocean, the question was raised as to whether death occurred in the air
or on the sea after the crash. The district court stated that this was not a
material issue because the act should apply vertically as well as horizontally,
and that the expression "on the high seas is wholly and only geographic."'
This suggested extension was accepted in D'Aleman v. Pan American
World Airways" where the plaintiff's decedent had died after an allegedly
negligent announcement that the plane would have to make an unsched-
741 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or
the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the
personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district
courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or cor-
poration which would have been liable if death had not ensued.
8247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
'The court specifically refused to rule on the question of whether contact with the water was
a necessary element of the locality test. Id. at 678.
"0255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958).
11 The court did not make a finding as to whether death occurred on or above the high seas.
Id. at 824.
12316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), noted J. AIR L. & COM. 372 (1963).
"s Id. at 763. It should be noted, however, that in some admiralty cases the locality test is not
the sole determining factor to which the court looks for its jurisdiction. In certain non-tortious
cases, the court deals only with vessels, and airplanes have been generally held not to be vessels. See,
e.g., United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (1950); Noakes v. Imperial Airways, 29 F. Supp.
412 (1939). The Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 173 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §
1109(a), 72 Stat. 799, 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1964)) established this rule in connection with
the navigation and shipping laws as applied to foreign commerce.
'4 The history of the act is treated extensively in Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp.
85, 87-91 (W.D. Cal. 1954).
"In re Ocean S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
16 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y.).
'7Id. at 484.
"s259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
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uled stop. There was no contact with the sea. The Second Circuit held
that Death on the High Seas Act granted a right of action in admiralty
for such a death. The court reasoned:
The Act was designed to create a [uniform] cause of action in an area not
theretofore under the jurisdiction of any court .... The statutory expression
"on the high seas" should be capable of expansion to, under, or, over, as
scientific advances change the methods of travel."
Congress has further extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to
place any United States aircraft or aircraft owned by a United States
citizen or corporation in flight over the high seas, within their jurisdiction
for criminal actions."0 Until the principal case, however, the question of
which court had jurisdiction over a tort occurring over the high seas had
not been decided.
The respondent in Notarian did not deny the validity of the locality
test, but, relying upon Noel," Trihey,5 and Weinstein," argued that con-
tact with the water was a necessary prerequisite to its applicability. The
district court disposed of these cases stating, "none of these cases hold that
contact with the water is indispensable to an admiralty tort."" In support
of its decision to extend admiralty jurisdiction to tortious injuries occur-
ring over the high seas, the court analogized the common law doctrine of
cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum' to this extension, questioning "are
we not logically compelled to adopt the perpendicular plane theory as a
jurisdictional guide?" 2 Judge Rosenberg further relied on the D'Aleman2"
case, reasoning that if the Death on the High Seas Act could be extended
to give a remedy in admiralty for death over the high seas, then the general
constitutional admiralty jurisdiction should also be extended to afford a
uniform remedy for tort injury occurring over the high seas.
The legal jurisdictional vacuum created by the advent of air travel has
required either that new legislation be enacted or that the existing rules
of jurisdiction be extended to this area. Logically, the same need for uni-
formity which prompted Congress and the courts to extend statutory
admiralty jurisdiction to encompass criminal acts and tortious deaths
occurring over the high seas was present in the principal case, particularly
since there was a need to interpret common law tort rules rather than
specific statutory language. The decision in Notarian is the logical result
based on sound legal reasoning and should be an accepted precedent in
admiralty law. Allen C. Rudy, Jr.
11Id. at 495.
20 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1964).
2"Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957).
52Trihey v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958).
' Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
'Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874, 875 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
" This maxim may be paraphrased: He who owns the soil or surface of the ground owns, or
has exclusive right to, everything which is upon or above it to an indefinite height.
26244 F. Supp. at 876. This theory has been applied to torts committed by airplanes while in
flight over land. See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
27D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Warsaw Convention - Choice of Forum - Article 28
Plaintiff Eck, a resident of California, made arrangements for a trip
to Europe and the Near East through the Scandinavian Airlines System
(SAS) office in California. During the leg of the trip from Jerusalem,
Israel, to Cairo, Egypt, a United Arab Airlines (UAA) passenger plane
crashed in a sandstorm in Wadi Halfa, Sudan, Africa, and plaintiff suf-
fered paralyzing injuries. Alleging negligence on the part of UAA, an air
carrier domiciled in Egypt with its principal place of business in Cairo,
plaintiff instituted suit in a New York state court. Since this was an inter-
national flight and both the United States and Egypt are signatories, the
plaintiff chose to bring suit under the terms of the Warsaw Convention.'
UAA was served at its only United States office-a ticket office in New
York City.' Apparently no agency relationship existed between SAS and
UAA. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that under Article
28 (1), New York was not where UAA "has a place of business through
which the contract has been made... '' The motion was denied without
opinion, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Division which
unanimously reversed.' The plaintiff filed an appeal in the New York
Court of Appeals. Held, remanded for trial: The provisions of Article
28 (1) do not require a literal interpretation. When a ticket for passage
on a foreign carrier engaged in international flight has been purchased
in the United States, the Warsaw Convention is satisfied if suit is brought
in a State where the airline has an office, notwithstanding the office took
no part in the processing of the ticket. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.,
15 N.Y.2d 53, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 203 N.E.2d 640 (1965).
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention), 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Star. 3000, T.S. 876 (1934).
2 This office took no part in the processing of claimant's ticket.
a Warsaw Convention, art. 28:
1. An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the
domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a
place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination. (Emphasis added.)
2. Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted.
SEck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 20 App. Div. 2d 454, 247 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1964). The plain-
tiff in the meantime had instituted suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York on 10 March 1964, apparently fearing the lapse of the statute of limitations of the
Convention (art. 29), and possible reversal by the Appellate Division. The defendant again moved
to dismiss on the same grounds asserted in the state court. The district court granted this motion,
reasoning that since the UAA sales ticket office had not processed the ticket and SAS had not acted
as agent, the Southern District of New York was not "where [the defendant] has a place of business
through which the contract has been made." Eck v. United Arab Airlines, S.A.A,, 247 F. Supp.
804 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This case is presently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
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I. WARSAW CONVENTION-INTENT OF DRAFTERS AND PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE 28 (1)
The Warsaw Convention, a multilateral, legislative treaty," was ratified
in 1928 and was immediately recognized as an important legal advance-
ment.' The Convention gives a claimant a cause of action for injuries
sustained on an international flight' with liability being based upon the
contract of carriage-either the ticket if a passenger suffers injury, or
the air waybill if goods are partially or totally destroyed s The drafters
sought "to effect uniformity of procedures and remedies,"9 thereby in-
creasing the chances of an injured claimant's being able to recover dam-
ages." One way they chose to effect uniformity was by limiting the places
in which suit might be brought. Under Article 28 (1) a carrier can only
be sued at maximum in one of four national territories. 1 A plaintiff is
' This modern classification is contrasted with the older type of "treaty having the character of
a contract." The primary distinction is that in the contractual type of treaty (Vertrag), the parties
have separate interests such as the buyer and seller in a commercial contract. But the legislative
treaty (Vereinbarung) is "the agreement which serves the purpose of identical aims." See McNAIR,
LAW OF TREATIES 739-54 (1961). The Warsaw Convention would seem to fit in this latter cate-
gory, since it is a treaty for "The Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air" which is equally binding on all signatory nations.
0 BILLYOU, AIR LAW 124 (2d ed. 1964).
'This presupposes that a locus of Article 28(1) is present in a signatory nation, since by inter-
national law a non-Warsaw country is not bound by the Convention terms. See McKenry, Judicial
Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 205, 219-21 (1963).
'This idea is reflected in the comments by Mr. Clarke, the British delegate to the 1928 Con-
vention, concerning the deletion of the place of accident from the provisions of Article 28. He
stated, in part:
[T]he first point to be brought out is that the place of accident has absolutely no
connection with the contract or with the place to which the parties are considered
to have given jurisdiction. Ordinarily contract law assigns jurisdiction to the place
where the contract was made, but the place where the accident occurs may have
absolutely no relation to the contract. Warsaw Convention Documents 77-79 (1928).
'Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REv. 423, 425-26 (1945).
" There are many reasons for inability to recover including an underdeveloped or primitive
legal system in the locus of the accident or inability to obtain jurisdiction over a carrier due to
variations in legal systems from country to country.
" See note 3 supra. K. N. Beaumont, speaking of proposed changes in Article 28(1) which
should take into consideration, stated:
[Iln order to lessen the possibility of actions arising from the same accident being
tried in several different States, it is desirable to limit jurisdiction as much as possible,
while preserving to the claimant all reasonable latitude. (Emphasis added.)
Beaumont, Warsaw Convention--Comparison of 1929 Text With Proposed Beaumont Revision
(Draft of December 1946), 14 J. AIR L. & COM. 87, 106 (1947). This post-World War II view
still recognized a need for the limitation of jurisdiction to aid the carrier. Thus, the original intent
of the drafters has been accorded approval even to recent times. Of course a claimant can bring
suit outside the Convention by suing in a non-signatory country. He would not, of course, be
guaranteed the benefit of the Convention's favorable provisions. (The signatory nations are desig-
nated in the Convention as "High Contracting Parties.")
It is not the purpose of this note to discuss the controversy as to whether the provisions of
Article 28(1) are "venue" or a concept resembling "jurisdiction over the subject matter." Compare
Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 1961 U.S. & Can. Av. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), treating Ar-
ticle 28 (1) as relating to "venue," with Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation de la Naviga-
tion Aerienne, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962) and Martino v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1961
U.S. & Can. Av. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1961), treating Article 28(1) as relating to "jurisdiction." In
its full scope, the provision is probably neither, but the confusion arises as to when Article 28(1)
is met and when Article 28(2), concerning local law, becomes applicable under a dual state and
federal court system such as exists in the United States. Presumably, in considering Eck, the Second
Circuit will continue to treat Article 28(1) as applicable only to national territories and not to
"areas within a particular High Contracting Party." E.g., Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341
F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Berner v. United Airlines, 3 App. Div. 2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884
(1956); McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 205
(1963); Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9 McGILL L.J. 352
(1963).
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also benefited by having four guaranteed locations where a court will
have the power to hear the suit, assuming any or all of the four places
are found within the territory of a signatory nation. The provisions of
Article 28 (1) seem to be terse, explicit statements completely free from
ambiguity, with the possible exception of the provisions relating to "the
domicile of the carrier."'" This possible ambiguity has been the subject of
much consideration. 3 Also, conflict has arisen in the past concerning the
second provisions of Article 28 (1)-the "carrier's principal place of
business." In Windsor v. United Airlines, Inc.," the court interpreted this
provision to mean in effect "a principal place of business." However, five
years later, another court emphatically denounced this interpretation,
stating that there could be only one principal place of business." Ob-
viously, this latter interpretation gives effect to the literal meaning of
Article 28 (1). Although benefit accrues to both parties under the Con-
vention's terms, the drafters apparently intended that the Convention
primarily benefit the then infant airlines."
The drafters further intended that the Warsaw Convention be syste-
matically revised to reflect new developments and changes, recognizing
that rarely can a treaty be drafted which will not become obsolete, and
that recurring problems will generally result from an attempt to unify
the laws of as many nations as the Convention encompasses. They mani-
fested such intent by including revision clauses in the Convention. 7
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
Constitutional and substantive limitations are also applied by United
States courts when treaty provisions and interpretations are involved in
a suit. The United States Constitution gives treaty law the status of
supreme law of the land." A treaty has been defined as a bargain" which
creates obligations based on the good faith of the parties." To determine
" See note 3 supra.
13 See GoEDHuis, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATION AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 292, 293 (1937);
Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 J. AIR L. 1, 46
(1936).
14153 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
" Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 207 F. Supp. 191,
192 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
"s Kuhn, The Warsaw Convention on International Transportation by Air, 24 AM. J. INT'L L.
746, 748 (1930):
[the Warsaw Convention's] . . .provisions seem to some to be unduly favorable to
the carrier; but when the insurance companies have a somewhat better basis for cal-
culating their acturial risks, insurance will be generally resorted to in protecting
against losses. It is true, that the Convention is designed to encourage the extension
of air transportation and its provisions must be viewed in that light. (Emphasis
added.)
17 See Article 39 (concerning denunciation of the Convention by a High Contracting Party),
Article 40 (concerning denunciation in whole or in part, or changing the original scope of the
Convention as applicable to a territory of a High Contracting Party), and Article 41 (concerning
future conventions for the improvement of the treaty provisions). See also BILLYOU, Op. cit. supra
note 6, at 580-84.
"s U.S. CONST. art. IV.
"Jay, The Federalist Papers, No. LXIV 421 (Modern Library ed.).
" Hamilton, The Federalist, No. LXXV 486 (Modern Library ed.). See also Ware v. Hylton,
I U.S. (3 Dall.) 164, 181 (1796), for the United States Supreme Court's classic position toward
treaties.
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the exact nature of these obligations, it seems necessary to look to the
intent of the parties. The courts give a treaty a reasonable and sensible
interpretation"' by examining the treaty as a whole,2 and thereby give
effects to the apparent intent and purposes of the parties to the treaty."
Courts recognize that they may not modify, alter, or amend a treaty, 4
but must enforce the treaty as written if the terms are clear and unam-
biguous,' regardless of the resultant inconvenience to the parties.' The
courts must construe statutes as they find them and may not sit in review
of the discretion of the legislature. The same is true, by analogy, as to
treaties.
III. ECK V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
The New York Court of Appeals said that the Appellate Division erred
in reaching "its conclusion by applying mechanically the literal translation
of a phrase without analysis of the treaty."'" The court felt that such a
literal translation "might not have done violence to the over-all scheme
and design of the Convention under existing conditions when the treaty
was drafted,"29 but that changes and advancements in booking passage on
airlines since 1928 must be taken into consideration. The majority of the
court felt that the Convention should be examined as a whole" and that
"what is to be applied are .. . [the Convention's] principles if its pur-
poses are to be observed presently as in the past."'2 The court reasoned
that when UAA opened its New York office, it anticipated being amenable
to suits in the United States as a result of having an office in this country
even though the office had not processed or had any dealings with plaintiff's
ticket." The court considered that "chance circumstances of where the
plaintiff made her purchase of the ticket within the territory of a high
contracting party should not relieve the airline of the burden of litiga-
tion here. . . ."" Taking this liberal view, the court felt that under Article
21Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909).
"United States ex rel. Cook v. Karnuth, 24 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds,
279 U.S. 231 (1929).
"Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); American Trust Co. v.
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957); Aerovias Interamericanas De Panama, S.A. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 802 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963).
4 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
"See, e.g., Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963); Hidalgo County Water Control &
Imp. Dist. No. 7 v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956);
Savelis v. Vlachos, 137 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd, 248 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1957).
"In re Zalewski's Estate, 177 Misc. 384, 30 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
27 See, e.g., People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 79, 96 N.E.2d 184, 185 (1950), appeal dismissed,
341 U.S. 907 (1951); Russo v. Valentine, 294 N.Y. 338, 62 N.E.2d 221 (1945); Lawrence
Constr. Corp. v. State, 293 N.Y. 634, 639, 59 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1944).
21 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251, 203 N.E.2d 640, 641.
29 Ibid.
3Id. at 59, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 252, 203 N.E.2d at 642.
"Id. at 59, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 251, 203 N.E.2d at 641. (All italicized in original.)
"Id. at 58, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 250, 203 N.E.2d at 641. The Court also noted the fact that had
the plaintiff purchased her ticket through the New York office, "the defendant would have to
concede jurisdiction to our courts."
"id. at 58, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 251, 203 N.E.2d at 641.
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28 (1), suit could properly be maintained in New York. 4
It is important to note that the court placed no reliance on any finding
of ambiguity in the third locus of Article 28 (1). This would seem to be
the correct view." However, the court should have given effect to the
intent of the drafters to provide for uniformity of procedures by limiting
places where suit may be brought. In effect, the decision broadened and
revised a provision intended to be restrictive. Such revision in a multi-
lateral treaty should be done through protocol as provided in the Con-
vention, and until the Convention is revised it should remain binding on
the parties subject to the original limitations and purposes of the drafters. "
As has been noted, the loci of Article 28 (1) are based on the contract
between the carrier and a claimant." The emphasis of the Convention is
therefore on the personal relationship of the parties within the framework
of their contract of carriage and not on liability of the carrier to passengers
in general. UAA could not have anticipated being amenable to suit in
the United States because its New York office in fact had no dealings
whatsoever with the contract between Eck and UAA.5 From a practical
standpoint, the proceeds of the ticket sales of the New York office and
those from sales to passengers like Eck will become a part of the same
financial statements of the airline, and "sale" necessary to bring the tickets
of Eck and like passengers within the bounds of the third locus might
only be the mechanical stamping or recording of the ticket by a clerk in
that office. However, the Convention made no provision for any deviation
from the four loci enumerated in Article 28 (1).3
Of course, if Article 28 (1) had been given a literal interpretation, Eck
would have been unable to bring suit in the United States. However
illogical this may be from a pragmatic point of view, it may be justified
by the intent and purposes sought to be achieved by the drafters of the
Convention and also by the fact that another forum is generally available.
In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo (then the Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals) the court's function is
not of declaring justice between man and man, but of settling the law. The
court exists, not for the individual litigant, but for the indefinite body of
litigants, whose causes are potentially involved in the specific cause at issue."
This idea is especially pertinent when one considers that in attempting to
" The dissent felt that such a liberal interpretation of Article 28 (1) was not authorized by
the Convention and apparently concluded that to come within Article 28(1), the sale must have
been processed through the sole United States office of UAA. Id. at 63-64, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56,
203 N.E.2d at 644-45.
3' See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
'See generally McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 739-54 (1961), especially at 747. See also note 17
supra.
" See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
"s It is difficult to see how the question of anticipated amenability of a carrier can be a point
of concern in a case such as Eck, since this fact can depend on varying local laws of the several
High Contracting Parties. To consider this question would defeat the very purpose of the Con-
vention-"uniformity of procedure and remedies." See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
3 McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & CoM. 205,
217 (1963).
40 CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 11-12
(2d ed. 1909).
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draft a treaty with the scope of the Warsaw Convention, the drafters must
necessarily take a similar attitude to insure proper effectiveness of the
terms of the treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that Article 28 (1) must be literally interpreted. This
may be justified primarily on two grounds. First, the drafters intended
that any inadequacies of the treaty should be revised and modified by the
signatories, and the Convention itself includes provisions for such revision."'
The fact that revision has not occurred with the intended frequency
probably desired does not change the purpose and intent embodied within
the original draft. Secondly, there is an advantage per se to the claimant
under the Convention terms. That is, the claimant does have four guaran-
teed locations in which suit may be brought, notwithstanding that the
Convention does not, by any means, guarantee that all of the provisions
of Article 28 (1) will be met in each suit." Indeed, if none of the loci
are met within a High Contracting Party, then a claimant will have no
acceptable forum under the Convention. However, this is more than a
claimant would be assured of if the Convention, even in its present form,
were not in existence, and greatly overshadows any inconvenience to him.
An interpretation other than a "mechanically literal" one destroys the
intent and purpose of uniformity which the Convention drafters appar-
ently sought to attain. One can see little difference in the interpretation
given Article 28 (1) by the New York Court of Appeals, and a deviation
from the Convention by allowing suit at the place of accident when that
country has a well developed system of law. This was clearly not the in-
tention of the drafters."
There should be a two-step approach to solving the problem raised in
cases like Eck. First, if an agency arrangement can be determined between
the issuing carrier and the claimant, then, according to one author," the
third locus of Article 28 (1) would be met within the boundaries of the
High Contracting Party where the ticket was sold.' Second, if there is no
agency relationship, then the third locus must finally be ruled out, and the
claimant must seek a forum under the remaining three."
It is doubtful that all inconvenience in the Warsaw Convention can be
eliminated by future modifications. It is hoped, however, that clarification
of the provisions of Article 28 in relation to the dual court system in the
United States will be made in order to eliminate much of the confusion
which has developed. Stephen F. Hefner
41 See note 6 supra.
4 See note 7 supra.
" See note 8 supra.
'"McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & CoM. 205,
210-15 (1963).
' See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, S.A.A., supra note 4, at 807, where the federal district judge
found merely an ad hoc agency relationship existed between SAS and UAA, which if correct, does
not bring the Eck case within this alternative.
4 In Eck, Switzerland, the place of destination for the trip, and Egypt, the domicile and princi-
pal place of business of UAA, remain as choices of forum. The Eck court stated that it could find
no venue based upon the agency theory as there was "no close relationship between the airlines
offices." 241 F. Supp. at 807.
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Warsaw Convention - Article 25 - "Wilful Misconduct"
On 29 October 1953, a commercial airliner enroute from Sydney,
Australia, to San Francisco, crashed into a California mountain leaving no
survivors. There were no reports of aircraft malfunctioning and no evi-
dence of any malfunctioning was found upon examination of the wreck-
age. Several times during the flight, the crew had received and acknowl-
edged orders to remain 500 feet above the clouds until passing over the
ILS outer marker.1 The pilot did not pass over the ILS outer marker and
the aircraft was under the prescribed altitude when it crashed. Plaintiff
brought suit for wrongful death of one of the passengers. In an effort
to avoid the damage limitation of the Warsaw Convention,' "wilful mis-
conduct" by the carrier was alleged. After the jury returned a verdict for
the defendant, the trial court directed judgment non obstante veredicto
in favor of the plaintiff, holding the defendant guilty of "wilful mis-
conduct" as a matter of law.' Held, reversed: The jury verdict was not
against the weight of the evidence. The trial judge erred in charging that
actual knowledge of the consequences is not a necessary element in find-
ing "wilful misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention. Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
When the Warsaw Convention was enacted, the airline industry was in
its infancy and the argument was made that it needed a great deal of
protection and pampering to survive and grow. The Warsaw Conference
formulated this protection, in part, through limitation on a carrier's
liability for personal injuries to its passengers on international flights.4
Article 25 provides for the removal of protection through limited liability
where there is "wilful misconduct" or by such default on a carrier's part
as is considered, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case
is submitted, to be equivalent to "wilful misconduct."'
The Conference delegates adopted the French terms dol and faute lourde
as descriptive of the requisite misconduct claimants must show in order
to avoid the limited liability under Article 25.' After considerable dis-
' The ILS outer marker situated on the shore of San Francisco Bay is the key to the Instrument
Landing System (ILS) at San Francisco International Airport. The marker consists of two trans-
mitters, one which covers a large area and another which radiates its signal over a very small,
precise area.
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention), 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1934).
'Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
' Warsaw Convention, arts. 17, 20, 22. Article 17 imposes absolute liability upon the air carrier
for all personal injuries regardless of fault while Article 22 provides a limit of 125,000 French gold
francs or approximately $8,300. Article 20 excuses this liability if the carrier proves that it has
taken all necessary steps to avoid the damage, or that it was impossible for it to take them.
' Warsaw Convention, art. 25 (1).
' Ibid. (official French version).
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cussion as to the translation of these terms into English, one of the British
delegates declared:
We have in our law the expression wilful misconduct. I believe that it
comprehends all that you want to say: it includes not only acts wilfully
performed, but also acts of carelessness with disregard of the conse-
quences. . . .We have in order to translate those words into English the
expression "wilful misconduct" which is well known and well defined in
our law.7
This concept of "wilful misconduct" was accepted as the official English
translation of dol and faute lourde s It seems the British delegate to the
conference was in error when he said the term "wilful misconduct" was
well defined. In 1915, in Norris v. Great Cent. Ry., an English court had
defined "wilful misconduct" as:
misconduct to which the will is a party as contradistinguished from accident,
and is far beyond any negligence, and involves that a person wilfully mis-
conducts himself who knows and appreciates that it is wrong conduct on
his part in the existing circumstances to do a particular thing, and yet in-
tentionally does it ... regardless of the consequences;'
The court's interpretation included only acts willfully performed with
knowledge of the consequences. On the other hand, the British delegate's
interpretation covered not only acts willfully performed, but also acts of
carelessness with disregard of the consequences. In 1953, an English court
was again confronted with a problem of "wilful misconduct" but this
time under the Warsaw Convention. The court followed the interpreta-
tion given by the British delegate at Warsaw by instructing that:
To be guilty of wilful misconduct the person concerned must appreciate
that he is acting wrongfully or he is wrongfully omitting to act, and yet
persists in so acting or omitting to act regardless of the consequences, or acts
or omits to act with reckless indifference as to what the result may be.10
This is a much broader definition than that stated in Norris. Indeed, the
Norris definition is only the first of two alternative requisites found in
the later case. Shawcross and Beaumont have concluded that English courts
today interpret "wilful misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention as
an intentional act or failure to act (1) where the person knows it is a
breach of his duty under the circumstances, or (2) "knows he is likely
to cause injury to third parties," or (3) "with reckless indifference does
not know or care whether it is or is not a breach of his duty or is likely
to cause damage."'"
American cases manifest no consistent trend or pattern in the interpre-
tation of "wilful misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention. In Ameri-
'The official minutes were recorded in French. For a translation of the British delegate's re-
marks, see GUERRERI, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON THE WARSAW CONVENTION 12 (1960). See
also Guerreri, Wilful Misconduct in the Warsaw Convention: A Stumbling Block? 6 McGssL L.J.
267 (1960).
s Warsaw Convention, art. 25.
985 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 285 (1916).
'" Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corp., [1952] 2 All E.R. 1016 (Q.B.).
"lSHAwCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 345 (2d ed. 1951).
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can Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen the court approved a charge stating that it
would be "wilful misconduct" if the act was intentional with knowledge
that injury would likely result, "and likewise, if it was done with a wanton
and reckless disregard of the consequences."'" Such a charge, following the
prevalent English interpretation, is the liberal definition. Later, a federal
district court in New York gave a similarly liberal interpretation in a jury
charge"3 and the Second Circuit seemed to adopt the Ulen view in Pekelis
v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.4 However, that same year a jury
in a New York state court refused to find "wilful misconduct" when
instructed that under Article 25 it meant "a realization of the probability
of injury from the conduct and a disregard of the probable consequences.""
The same restrictive view was taken in Froman v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc.,
where the court charged that "the actor must have intended the result that
came about" or must have conducted himself "with knowledge of what
the consequences would be and have gone ahead recklessly despite his
knowledge of those conditions."'" In 1955, one court retreated from the
liberal definition applied in earlier cases and applied a strict definition
similar to that in Froman.'7 Subsequently, the Second Circuit approved a
charge in Grey v. American Airlines8 encompassing a strict interpretation
of "wilful misconduct" while affirming a judgment for the defendant
carrier. More recently, the District of Columbia Circuit retained its liberal
interpretation of "wilful misconduct" in its decision in Koninklijke
Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v.
Tuller."
This less-than-uniform approach to defining "wilful misconduct" illus-
trates the problem raised by international agreements when the drafters
seek to incorporate a legal term which may include different elements in
the various legal systems. Notwithstanding that the term used is a recog-
nized legal concept in American jurisdictions, the elements intended by
the drafters should be controlling in suits arising under the Warsaw Con-
vention. The British delegate to the Conference raised the term as a legal
concept corresponding to the French concept of dol, and this was accepted
by the delegates. It would appear, then, that his interpretation should be
controlling. It is evident, therefore, that the drafters meant to include
within the term not only acts done with knowledge of the consequences
but also acts done in reckless disregard of the consequences. The require-
ment of knowledge is only necessary when showing acts performed within
the former. Such a conclusion is reinforced when viewed in the light of
the language drafted in The Hague Protocol. Article 25 of the Warsaw
Convention was amended to read:
" 186 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, 1949 U.S. Av. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
14 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951).
" Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, 1951 U.S. Av. 527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951), judgment
modified but court's charge approved, 281 App. Div. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952).
101953 U.S. & Can. Av. 1, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
'TRashap v. American Airlines, 1955 U.S. & Can. Av. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"'227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955).
9 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved
that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants
or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge
that damage would probably result ... "
This amendment by a change in wording indicates a dissatisfaction with
the language in the Warsaw Convention among the nations which drafted
and signed The Hague Protocol. Apparently, this was due to a change in
times and circumstances plus a desire to decrease the situations where a
carrier may have unlimited liability. As a compromise, the maximum
limited liability was doubled.21 The Protocol restricts unlimited liability by
replacing "wilful misconduct" with the requirement of knowledge as to
both intentional damage and recklessness.
It is doubtful that a floodgate will be opened by the liberal interpreta-
tion of "wilful misconduct." In only a small number of the cases applying
it has there been a finding of "wilful misconduct,"22 because of the diffi-
culty in proving "wilful misconduct" in serious mishaps by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Often there are no living witnesses to testify to the
pilot's knowledge or actions. However, the number of decisions is not truly
indicative as many cases have apparently been settled for amounts in
excess of Warsaw limits because the airline felt there was a possibility of
a finding of "wilful misconduct.""5
In Berner, the court of appeals applied the strict interpretation of "wil-
ful misconduct" to which it had returned in Grey. The trial judge had
charged that "wilful misconduct" was the intentional performance of an
act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the probable con-
sequences.' The judge had also charged that:
[T]he pilot's conduct would be in reckless disregard of the probable conse-
quences . .. if the pilot intentionally did an act, or failed to do an act,
which it was his duty to the passengers to do, knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that his conduct
not only created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the passengers, but
also involved a high degree of probability that substantial harm would result
to the aircraft and the passengers by doing or failing to do that in question."
Although the charge conformed with the principles expressed in the Re-
statement of Torts," the court of appeals found error in its failure to
require that knowledge must be coupled with recklessness. In so finding,
the court said that the charge in Ulen conformed with its concept of
"wilful misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention. However, Ulen re-
quired knowledge as only one of two alternative requisites. The Berner
" Protocol to Amend the Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 (The Hague Protocol), art. XIII, ICAO Doc.
7686-LC/140 (1955), 1955 U.S. & Can. Av. 521-51.
21 Ibid.
" See Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 291
(1965).
23 id. at 294.
24219 F. Supp. at 360.
25 Ibid.
2' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 500 (1965).
[Vol. 32
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
court's approval of the Ulen charge seems irreconcilable with its statement
that knowledge of the consequences must be found.
The trial court in Berner recognized the extreme difficulty of proving
the pilot's knowledge of the consequences in a serious air disaster where
there are no survivors to testify. It applied a legal concept whereby the
injured party need not prove the pilot's subjective knowledge, but need
only prove objective facts from which the jury may, by implication, find
that the pilot should have realized the danger and, therefore, acted in
reckless disregard of the consequences by intentionally performing the act.
The decision was reversed because the jury verdict was not against the
weight of the evidence, but the extensive treatment given by the court
to the requirement of knowledge of the consequences indicates the pre-
vailing view in the Second Circuit. That court will likely consider it re-
versible error for a trial court to not require knowledge of the probable
consequences as a necessary requisite for a finding of "wilful misconduct"
under the Warsaw Convention. The court's previous retreat from the
liberal interpretation of "wilful misconduct" in Pekelis to the more re-
strictive interpretation in Grey7 supports this conclusion. However, imme-
diately prior to Berner, the court upheld a finding of "wilful misconduct"
under the Warsaw Convention in LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Air-
lines28 where the facts were similar to those in Berner.
In LeRoy, the pilot of the flight incorrectly reported his position, and
on the basis of that report, the control tower authorized a descent. Since
the position report was incorrect, the plane crashed into a mountain after
making its descent to the prescribed altitude. The plaintiff contended
that the pilot intentionally misled the control tower as to his position,
and the jury found "wilful misconduct." The court did not discuss the
requirement of knowledge, and its only reference to "wilful misconduct"
was that:
The plaintiff does not contend that the plane was off course as a result of
wilful misconduct. Rather, he contends that the Sabena crew deliberately
misled the Rome controller as to their position and that the controller there-
fore authorized a descent which, though it would have been safe within the
airway, was fatal over the mountainous country to the east, where the plane
was then flying."
A reasonable inference from this would be that if the pilot intentionally
misled the controller, he would be guilty of "wilful misconduct." The
pilot's intentional act of misleading in LeRoy would be analogous to the
pilot's intentionally flying below a prescribed minimum altitude in Berner,
and to be consistent, if the jury had found that the pilot intentionally
flew below the prescribed altitude the court of appeals would have had to
affirm a "wilful misconduct" verdict.
The United States has withdrawn its denunciation of the Warsaw Con-
27227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955).
28 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
21 Id. at 268.
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vention ° but newly-approved tariffs go far to mitigate the monetary
limitations imposed by the Convention.3 However, the problems involved
in Berner remain in cases where an injured party wishes to sue for more
than the $75,000 allowed under the approved tariff arrangements. To
avoid further problems with the dol and "wilful misconduct" provisions,
the Warsaw Convention should be amended so that it explicitly sets out
the elements necessary for unlimited liability."
William C. Strock
"The denunciation was withdrawn on 14 May 1966, one day prior to the effective date of the
denunciation. See the official text of the withdrawal at page 248, supra. Concurrently, the Civil
Aeronautics Board approved an agreement among United States and foreign air carriers concerning
the liability of these carriers under the Warsaw Convention. Essentially, the carriers have foregone
defenses they could have raised under the Convention, and have agreed to a maximum limitation of
$75,000 for provable damages. The effect of this is that the participating carriers accept the
principle of absolute liability, i.e., liability without fault by the airline. CAB Press Release 66-61,
13 May 1966. For events leading up to the 15 November 1965 denunciation, see Kreindler, The
Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291 (1965). See also Time, 29 Oct.
1965, p. 98; Dep't State Press Release No. 268, 15 Nov. 1965; N. Y. Times, 23 Oct. 1965, § 1,
p. 30, col. 2 (city ed.).
" The tariff provisions discussed supra will not eliminate the possibility of suing for provable
damages in excess of $75,000, but the provisions of the Warsaw Convention will be applicable in
such a suit.
as An example of a definite clause on removal of limited liability which might be acceptable to




The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., an air freight carrier, filed a complaint
with the CAB challenging a Pan American World Airways tariff which
set forth special low rates limited to military stores shipped abroad under
United States Government bills of lading. The complaint contended that
the tariff was an impermissible classification of a shipper rather than the
familiar classification of a commodity and was, therefore, discriminatory
and in violation of section 404(b)1 and section 403 (b)' of the Federal
Aviation Act. The CAB dismissed the complaint and declined to initiate
a formal investigation of whether the Pan American rates applicable to
military transportation were unjustly discriminatory. Held: The Board
did not abuse its discretion. The duty imposed on the Board to investigate
complaints when there is a reasonable ground for doing so is only a duty
to exercise its sound discretion, and the Board may dismiss even a legally
sufficient complaint. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
Petitioner asserted that Pan American's rates violated section 404 (b) of
the act because the limitation to Defense Department shipments unjustly
discriminated against other shippers as a matter of law. In dismissing this
assertion, the Board had relied chiefly on the theory that carriage of mili-
tary property for the Government involves "circumstances and condi-
tions" justifying special rates and that military goods shipped by the
Government, and comparable goods shipped by private persons, could
not be classified as "like traffic." The Court of Appeals found it unneces-
sary to rule on the Board's reasoning, but merely stated that illegality as
a matter of law was not established by petitioner within the meaning of
section 404 (b). The section exists to protect shippers, not carriers, and
petitioner failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the rates would
cause some substantial injury to shippers. The absence of the Government
from the list of persons in section 403 (b) who may be afforded special
rates did not improve the petitioner's position. The court felt that section
403 (b) was concerned only with enforcement of currently effective
tariffs and prevention of rebates, rather than being directed toward pre-
vention of unjust discrimination. J.E.B.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1964), pro-
vides that no air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or ad-
vantage to any particular person in air transportation, or subject any particular person to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403(b), 72 Stat. 759, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1373(b)
(1964), prohibits the charging of greater or less or different rates for air transportation than
the currently effective tariffs, excepting certain concessions allowable to specified persons and
instances.
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EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT REPORTS -
SECTION 701 (e)
Defendant, while landing, damaged his aircraft which was rented from
Aviation Enterprises, Inc. At the trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce
a photostatic copy of the defendant pilot's accident report to the Civil
Aeronautics Board. The report tended to support plaintiff's theory of
negligence, and the court asked to admit the document as an admission
against interest. The defendant, called as an adverse witness, admitted
that the photostatic copy of the report contained a photostatic copy of
his signature, and that he had made and signed such a report. The docu-
ment was not admitted into evidence because it was not "best evidence."
Held, reversed and remanded: The best evidence rule is not applicable to
a photostatic copy of the accident report when offered as an admission
against the defendant who had admitted that his signature appeared there-
on. Aviation Enterprises, Inc. v. Cline, 395 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965).
The primary reason for admissibility was that the document was offered
as an admission, and the best evidence rule was not applicable. The report
was also admissible as being collateral to the issue of negligence. Though
not raised in the trial court, the defendant contended on appeal that Sec-
tion 701 (e) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 excluded the use of the
accident report. The statute applies, however, only to matters of evalua-
tion, opinion, and conclusion as to the causes of airplane crashes.' At
least one federal court has held that the report of the pilot of a crashed
aircraft is not excluded from evidence by section 701 (e).' The points
decided by the Missouri court have rarely arisen, but the holding appears
to be in line with those in similar cases.
C.A.T.
WARSAW CONVENTION - ARTICLE 8 - VALIDITY OF
DUAL PURPOSE WAYBILLS
Plaintiffs' bullion was lost during an air shipment from London to
Zurich. The "air consignment note" (waybill) specifically limited liability
of the carrier under the Warsaw Convention' to 250 French gold francs
per kilogram unless there was a higher declared value by the shipper. Plain-
tiffs had not declared a higher valuation, but contended that the carrier
was not entitled to the liability limitation because it had not complied
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 701, 72 Stat. 781, as amended, 76 Stat. 921 (1962), 49
U.S.C. 1441 (1964):
(e) No part of any report or reports of the Board relating to any accident or the
investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for
damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.
'Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
'Tansey v. TWA, 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949).
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (effective 29 Oct. 1934).
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with Article 8 which requires that "the air consignment note shall con-
tain ... a statement that the carriage is subject to ...this Convention."
The language on the waybill was that "Carriage . . .is subject to ...the
[Warsaw Convention] . . . unless such carriage is not 'international
carriage' as defined by the Convention." The lower court held that the
dual purpose air carriage note was useful, and moreover, that the carriage
was "international carriage" and the "unless" clause was not applicable.
Held, affirmed: A dual purpose waybill is valid under the Warsaw Con-
vention and the Carriage by Air Act, 1932.2 Samuel Montagu & Co. v.
Swiss Air Transport Co., [1966] 1 All E.R. 814 (C.A.).
The important question decided by the English Court of Appeals in
this case was one which affects shippers and carriers throughout the world.
The "unless" clause, which allows waybills to be used in both international
and domestic carriage, is part of an approved International Air Transport
Association (IATA) form. The court pointed out that it would be im-
practicable to require an unequivocal statement that the carriage was
international carriage subject to the Warsaw Convention. The English
court noted that in Seth v. BOAC,' the United States court had upheld a
clause identical to that in Montagu. Lord Justice Salmon stated that "I
should be sorry to decide that the law in England is different; it would be
fantastic if the success of an action on a contract of carriage depended on
whether it was brought in the Courts of the United States or in the Courts
of this country." He pointed out that it was desirable that both the form
of waybills, and the interpretation of the validity of them should be
consistent from country to country. This decision is undoubtedly correct
and is, in addition, an excellent example of the desirability of uniform
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.
C.A.T.
' Carriage by Air Act 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36.
3Seth v. BOAC, 216 F. Supp. 244 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 329 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 858.
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